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The French Connection and The Spanish Perception:
Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of
French Influence on Louisiana Civil Law
Vernon Valentine Palmer*
"It is a matter ofpublic notoriety that our St. Domingo Lycurgus
is avowedly copying his new code from that of Bonaparte, to the
infinite delight of the whole party by whom he is employed."
Jeremiah Brown'
the great difficulty which history records is not that of the
first step, but that of the second step. What is most evident is not the
difficulty of getting a fixed law, but getting out of a fixed law;... not
of making the first preservative habit but of breaking through it and
reaching something better." Walter Bagehote
INTRODUCTION
The approaching bicentennial of the Code Napolon is a useful
moment in which to take stock of the past and future of our own
Civil Code. The Code Civil des Frangais has been vital to
Louisiana's entire experience with codification. It was one of the
models for the Digest of 1808, and it again served as a model for the
Civil Code of 1825. Even today, it appears to be serving as one of
the models for our present Code's revision. My paper, however,
deals with a broader subject than just the influence of the Code
Napoleon on Louisiana codification. Since Louisiana codifiers have
borrowed copiously from French commentators, projet drafts, and
other French sources, it is necessary to speak more widely of the
influence of French law on Louisiana civil law.
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Thomas Pickles Professor of Law and Director of European Legal Studies,
Tulane University. This article began as a paper commissioned by the Cour de
Cassation to commemorate the bicentennial of the Code Napolion in 2004. The
present article is an outgrowth of that paper. I have many friends and colleagues
to thank for their kind comments and criticisms of earlier drafts. My special
gratitude goes to Alain Levasseur, Michael McAuley, John Lovett, and particularly
Thomas Tucker for his insightful observations, patience, and encouraging advice.
Any errors that remain are of course mine alone.
1. A Short Letter to a Member of Congress Concerning the Territory of
Orleans (Washington D.C. 1806).
2. Physics and Politics 53 (2d ed, 1999).
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It is convenient for my purposes to consider French influence in
four historical phases. There is, first, the rise of French law in the
colony of Louisiana in the period 1699-1762. In this period the
Coutume de Paris and the great royal Ordonnances were in force.'
This early period will not receive much discussion, however, since it
had only limited impact upon the nineteenth century codification
movement. In the second period, 1762-1803, 4 the province was
ceded to Spain, and Madrid officially replaced French law with
Castilian law. The effect was to transform Louisiana into a Spanish
ultramarine province whose legal order now "derived from Castilian
law to the exclusion of other peninsular fueros."5 The non-foral
Castilian private law which Governor O'Reilly introduced was taken
in about equal parts from the Recopilaci6n of Castile and the Siete
Partidas. The Spanish period plays a more important role in this
study because a complicated legal dualism developed over the course
of it. There is evidence that officially-imposed Spanish law had
limited geographical and cultural reach and Louisianians clung to
their original private law at a folk level. The legal situation took on
additional complexity when Spanish rule ended. Spanish law
officially continued, but now it purported to serve as the derecho
comin of a French society entering an American union.
The third period, 1803-1828, comprises the early years after the
Louisiana Purchase. It saw the establishment of territorial
government, the quest for statehood, and most important to this
inquiry, Louisiana's push toward codification. Louisiana enacted two
procedural codes (1805, 1828), a crimes act (1805), two civil codes
(1808, 1825) and drafted but did not enact a criminal code and a
commercial code (1825). French legal influence emanated from
within and without: the Louisianians had an innate attachment and
preference for things French and French legal science exerted a
magnetic attraction on codifiers not only in Louisiana but in many
lands. The freshly-minted Code Napolion was never more highly
prized. By virtue of its sheer modernity, relevance, and accessibility
to Louisianians, it excelled in ways that its chief competitor at that
time-uncodified Spanish law-could not. The Legislature and its
3. Professor Baade describes the legal system of French Louisiana as
consisting of four discrete masses: (1) French royal legislation of general
applicability, as of 1717; (2) The Custom of Paris; (3) French royal legislation
enacted after August 1717; and (4) the enactments of the Superior Council in New
Orleans. Hans W. Baade, Marriage Contracts in French and Spanish Louisiana:
A Study in "Notarial" Jurisprudence, 53 Tul. L. Rev. 3, 9 (1978).
4. The cession fromFrance to Spain occurred in 1762, but Spain took no steps
to take possession of the province until 1766 and did not formally introduce its own
laws until November 1769.
5. Baade, supra note 1, at 40-43.
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appointed jurisconsults drafted and enacted civil codes borrowing
heavily from the Code Napolion, the Projet (1800) and French
commentators. All in all, nearly 85% of these new codes contained
French-derived articles. The actual motives of the redactors have
been difficult to reconstruct due to incomplete historical records, and
it has also been a daunting task to demonstrate what effect, if any,
these appropriations had on the existing Spanish law. Some scholars
theorize that the Legislature intended to codify Spanish substantive
ideas and merely used French-language equivalents out of
convenience. According to this "Spanish thesis," our present law
may still be, at a substantive level, Spanish. On the other hand, other
scholars, based upon meticulous tracing and overwhelming evidence
of verbatim and almost verbatim borrowings, believe that the true
sources were French (the "French thesis") and that French influence
remains predominate today. Depending on the proper outcome of
this debate, this third period is either the zenith or the nadir of French
legal influence in Louisiana.
This interesting controversy brings us to the modem era and a
period of declining French influence. The modem revision of the
Civil Code (1976-present) is the first serious attempt since 1825 to
modernize Louisiana civil law. The process of modernization has
considerably weakened the French connection.
This article covers a considerable amount of ground, and it may
be helpful to summarize where it leads. It begins in the third period
by taking a historical look at the Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code
of 1825 [§§1.0-1.2] in order to summarize the basis for French law
in Louisiana and to establish a certain baseline for comparative
purposes. The two codes are compared as to their form, structure, and
style. Next, the famous controversy over whether these two civil
codes are more influenced by Spanish than French law is examined
in some detail [§1.3]. The merits of the debate are central to an
inquiry on the extent of French influence, since if the "Spanish
thesis" is essentially correct, then scholarly claims and popular
perceptions about French influence must be seriously revised. The
discussion attempts first to clarify the debate and then to advance it
in three new directions [§ 1.4 (1-3)].
One new path is to focus attention upon substantive comparisons
between the two laws. It is observed that the only type of
investigation which could resolve the Pascal/Batiza debate, at least
from the Pascalian point of view, has never been carried out.
Although there has been comparative research on a few topics, we
have not had the benefit of a comprehensive substantive comparison
between the existing Castilian law and the borrowed French
provisions. Consequently we do not know the extent of the
substantive deviations, if any, which French models introduced into
10692003]
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Louisiana. In addressing this issue, I sketch a suggested
methodology to measure substantive differences and I employ a
newly discovered tool which Moreau Lislet himself provided in the
de la Vergne volume.6 The discovery is that Moreau's own hand
points to many salient areas of substantive difference. The first fruits
of this analysis are presented, and it is pointed out where research
should be directed in the future. The evidence, though partial and
preliminary (a limited number of subject areas were studied) makes
clear that the introduction of French models in 1808 did have deep
substantive repercussions. It brought in material original and
indigenous to France, often unknown to Spanish law and/or
incompatible with it, and in greater amounts than previously known
or shown. The analysis strongly supports the French thesis.
The second new direction focuses the inquiry less around the
Digest and more on the Civil Code of 1825. Being the later
expression of legislative will and also the immediate predecessor of
the modem law, the contents of this Code and the intentions of its
drafters are far more important to the question of substantive sources.
In the past, historians have dwelt almost exclusively upon the
obscurest link in the chain of evidence-the cloudy history and
inscrutable intentions of the Digest redactors. This new approach
looks ahead to the far clearer historical record surrounding the Civil
Code of 1825 to compare the evidence and test out theories. Analysis
of that record, in my view, is a second buttress for the French thesis.
As shown in their exposd des motifs and their Preliminary Report of
1823, the three Commissioners openly executed a plan to receive
French law at a substantive level. The methodology of 1825 is to
disclose and carefully distinguish Spanish and French sources.
Moreau Lislet H's procedures, as compared to the disputed and
arcane methods of Moreau Lislet I, show no evidence of an intent to
codify Spanish substance via French equivalents. This conclusion, I
argue, is of capital importance to the debate. It means that some
controversial claims and conjectures about the Digest have been
incorrectly projected beyond the Digest, even into the modem law.
Whatever one's theories about the Digest, Louisiana's Civil Code of
1825 represents an openly-stated and expanded reception of French
substantive law and codification ideals. That reception undermines
these wider claims.
The third new direction is to recognize that the merits of the
debate are intertwined with shifting judicial perceptions of the Code's
pedigree. For the last 150 years the prevailing view from the bench
6. Vernon V. Palmer, The Recent Discovery of Moreau Lislet's System of
Omissions and its Importance to the Debate Over the Sources ofthe Digest of 1808,
59 Loy. L. Rev. 301 (2003).
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has been that our Civil Code embodies French law. This mid-century
shift, being grounded in a literalist tradition, promoted an interactive
relationship with French civil law and basically foreclosed further
relationship with Spanish law. It objectively increased French
influence in Louisiana in many ways (e.g., cites to the Cour de
Cassation, translation of French authors). Much as the Spanish-
oriented outlook of earlier judges caused increased citations to
Spanish authorities and led to translation of the Las Siete Partidas, so
the prevailing "French perception" has increased French influence,
led to the translations of French commentators, and has even
influenced the views of historians. Historians use judicial views as
evidence of the merits of the debate. Even though this is a circular
form of proof, the objective changes brought about lend another type
of support to the French thesis.
Having completed this re-analysis of the Pascal/Batiza debate and
having unveiled new supporting evidence for the French thesis, the
article next inquires into the reasons why this tectonic shift in the
private law foundation should have occurred during the codification
period. Considerable discussion is devoted to the practical and
pragmatic explanations, [§1.6] but it is also argued [§1.7] that the
link between law and culture is equally important. Relying upon
specific historical events as well as similar experiences in other
mixed jurisdictions, the article argues that strong cultural attachment
to French law combined with Creole control of local democratic
institutions pulled the redactors and legislators toward this end.
The treatment of the third period closes with the observation that
the Civil Code remained essentially intact over the next 150 years,
1825-1975 [§2.0]. The discussion then turns to the modem Revision
of the Civil Code [§3.0]. Institutional areas such as Persons,
Property, Obligations and so forth are reviewed in order to gauge
how much of the original French contribution is still perceptible and
where it is now thin or nonexistent. One finds that a number of new
legal ideas and institutions have been introduced into the revised
Civil Code, but it is unlikely that one of these has a French stamp.
From a dynamic standpoint, it seems the French Civil Code is no
longer a supplier of new ideas for Louisiana. Nevertheless, the brick
and mortar from antecedent codes has not entirely disappeared, and
the reenacted articles still contain a perceptible French groundwork.
Research indicates, for example, that nearly sixty percent of the
revised law of property still has a substantive and linguistic basis in
the Code Napolion. Plainly the Revision was not a revolution. The
Code wears a new fagade, but much of the original foundation is left
undisturbed.
French influence in the modem era, however, cannot be
adequately assessed simply by tracing the lineage of the substantive
2003] 1071
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law or by a count of French-inspired articles. This article argues that
French legal influence has plunged in recent years mainly because an
important intangible-the intrinsic qualities expected of a
code-was lost during the revision process [§4.0]. One of the
residual gifts of the Code Napolon-the specifically French concept
of codification-is no longer alive and well in Louisiana. A master
architect of the revision has recently written a "Requiem" for the
Code,7 agreeing that it is now merely a Digest, a conclusion that the
present writer first presented in 1988. In the final section [§5.0] this
Article describes and illustrates in structural and methodological
terms the deterioration from code into digest.
1.0 The Historical Starting Point: Louisiana 's First Ties to the
Code Napoleon and Other French "Sources "
It is not my purpose to trace the history of Louisiana from the
earliest days of French settlement or to discuss the laws and
institutions which French sovereigns introduced in the 18th century.
I begin immediately in the period after the Louisiana Purchase of
1803 when the immense estate was sold to the United States by
Napoleon, and a new state consisting of "Lower Louisiana" was
created and entered the Union. In this period Louisiana launched on
the course of codification, first with the Digest of 1808 (more
properly called "A Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the
Territory of Orleans") and later with the enactment of the Civil Code
of 1825.10 The character and content of these codes, enacted at a time
when Louisiana was still intensely French in culture and language
were closely based upon the Code Napoldon, the Projet of 1800 and
writings of early French commentators. No extended demonstration
of a filial relationship will be necessary, for detailed research by
Professor Rodolfo Batiza has already produced abundant evidence of
it.11
7. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative Essay,
78 Tul. L. Rev. 379 (2003).
8. Vernon V. Palmer, Death of a Code-The Birth ofa Digest, 63 Tul. L. Rev.
221 (1988).
9. As explained infra in note 36, in most cases I will use the word "source"
of law in a restrictive, linguistic sense.
10. Other codes were also enacted or planned in this period, including the
Practice Act of 1805, a Crimes Act of 1805, The Code of Practice of 1828, and a
Commercial Code (drafted but not enacted).
11. The sources of both codes were traced linguistically and conceptually in a
wide-ranging examination and the results were compiled into a four-fold
classification scheme. Professor Batiza's study of the 1808 Code or Digest is
found inRodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and
Present Relevance, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 4 (1971) [hereinafter 1808 Code Sources], and
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1.1 The Use of French Models in Writing the Digest of 1808
and the Code of 1825
The drafters of the 1808 Digest used the Projet du Gouvernement
of 1800 and the Code Napol6on of 1804 as their chief models. It had
long been falsely supposed that the redactors had no copy of the Code
Napol6on at their disposal in New Orleans and thus used the Projet
of 1800 as their principal model, but Professor Batiza's research
dispels that myth entirely. 2 The Projet was the source of 807
provisions and the French Civil Code was the source of 709
provisions. These sources alone account for about 70% of the Digest
provisions. This was not by any means the full extent of the French
contribution, however, for another 15% of the provisions were taken
from Domat, Pothier, the Custom of Paris, and the Ordonnance of
1667. All in all, 85% of the Digest came from French sources.
Strikingly, 617 articles were exact equivalents (in Professor Batiza's
schema, "verbatim" borrowings), 913 were classified as "almost
verbatim," and 225 were listed as "substantially influenced." This
wholesale transplant produced a work of clear French pedigree. 13
The premises of that conclusion have been challenged and remain
quite controversial, since the Pascalian school of thought regards the
Digest in a completely different historical light. This difference of
opinion plays a central role in this Article (see § 1.3) since there
would be little to recommend in a study of the scope of French
influence that ignored the possibility that Spanish law may instead be
the core of the private law system.
The framers of the Civil Code of 1825 did not discard the
contents of the Digest and simply begin on a fresh slate. They
retained nearly three-quarters of the Digest's 2160 provisions and
transposed them directly into the corpus of the new Code.
his study of the 1825 Civil Code is found in Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of
the Louisiana Projetofl823: A GeneralAnalyticalSurvey, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1972)
[hereinafter 1825 Code Sources].
12. Indeed, four original editions of the 1804 Code were found in Moreau
Lislet's personal library. See Mitchell Franklin, Libraries of Edward Livingston
and ofMoreau Lislet, 15 Tul. L. Rev. 401,406 (1941). In addition, Henry Garland
discovered an original edition of the Code Napol6on with the autograph of Moreau
Lislet on the title page. The Times-Picayune, May 1, 1932, at col. 1, 25.
13. The remaining 15% of the articles were taken from an array of texts and
writers: Las Siete Partidas, Febrero, the Institutes, Blackstone, Justinian's Digest,
Curia Philipica, Gains, the Fuero Real, the Code Noir, the Ordinances of Bilbao,
and local Louisiana statutes. For John Cairns, the presence of these sources
indicates that the Digest is not a slavish copying of the Code Napolgon or its Projet.
He accepts that it is a "free mixture" of many sources and with some original
invention. J.W. Cairns, The 1808 Digest of Orleans and 1866 Civil Code of Lower
Canada: An Historical Study of Legal Change 632 (1980) (doctoral dissertation,
Edinburgh).
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Consequently the French lineage of the retained Digest provisions
passed into the bloodlines of the next Code. But the drafters added
another 1746 provisions of their own. This greatly lengthened the
Code (the Code's 3522 articles were far more than the Code
Napolon and almost one and one-half times the number of the 1808
Digest) without in any way weakening the connection to French
models. Two-thirds of this new material (more than 1,000
provisions) was taken from the writings of Pothier (246 articles),
Toullier (228 articles), the French Civil Code (150 articles), the
Louisiana 1808 Digest (139 articles), and Domat (55 articles). Thus,
in this lengthened and highly didactic Civil Code, French writers
assumed an expanded importance, now second only to the Code
Napolon. Furthermore, French influence appeared to advance vis ei
vis other competitors if only because Spanish and Roman sources
were used less than in the Digest. But was the advance of French law
in 1825 merely a matter of appearance, like the hall of mirrors at
Versailles, as the proponents of the Spanish thesis contend? I will
look at that interesting question after making comparisons with the
Code Napolgon as to form, structure, and style.
1.2 A Few Comparisons as to Form, Structure, and Style
Structurally, both the Digest and the Civil Code followed the
classic three-book arrangement of Gaius and the Code Napolion.
The style of the drafting was elegant and retained the epigrammatic
quality of the French texts. These literary qualities are evident in the
original texts drafted in French, however, the English version was a
poor translation that fell far below the French standard of drafting
and even contained substantive errors. Not surprisingly, the French
original was quickly recognized as the controlling version in case of
doubtful or conflicting meaning.
The outcome was a remarkable code with many original and
distinctive features. Sir Henry Maine believed that the 1825 Code
was a great achievement. To him it was ". . . of all the re-
publications of Roman law, the one which appears to us as the
clearest, the fullest, the most philosophical, and the best adapted to
the exigencies of modem society."1
An obvious deviation from French-style codification occurred in
the Digest and the Code with respect to inclusion of didactic
materials (including definitions of terms, 5 abundant use of
14. Peter Stein, Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: A Historical Essay, 46 La.
L. Rev. 241, 245 (1985).
15. Instances of this type are the definitions of third persons and solvency:
"With respect to a contract or judgment, third persons are all who are not parties to
[Vol. 631074
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illustrations, and instructions to judges on code interpretation), all of
which were kept to a minimum in France. 6 The expansion which
this entailed, as Mitchell Franklin characterized it, "was a difference,
in no small way, between a code that was a code, and a code that was
a code, a law school and doctrine all at once."17 An extraordinary
didactic feature of the Digest was a lengthy "Table Alphab6tique des
Matieres" (beginning with abandon, abrogations, absens, and so
forth) that was placed prior to the title page at the front of the
volume. This was a finder's guide to principal words and concepts
used in the Digest, in French and English, with internal page
references. Disguised as a table of contents, its real function appears
to have been that of an index, and seems to have been intended for
the average citizen and journeyman lawyer completely unfamiliar
with codes. This user-friendly feature may have been un-French but
it was very American and indicative of codification with a common
touch." An example of the same tendency, which had no counterpart
in the Code Napolion, was the inclusion of a Preliminary Title in
both enactments. The Preliminary Title contained instructions to the
judges regarding recognized sources of law, rules of interpretation,
how to fill gaps in the law, and so forth, all of which was
objectionable as being doctrinal and excluded in France for that
reason. 9 There was nevertheless a plausible reason to include
material of this kind in Louisiana. In this earliest period Louisiana
had no universities, law faculties, established chairs, 'nor any
developed legal literature. In short, Louisiana lacked the standard
it.... ." "Solvency is the ability to pay one's debts. He who can not pay all that he
owes is not solvent." La. Civ. Code art. 2078 (1870). Aside from a few useful
definitions, Article 3556 also contained a host of pedanticisms, including that the
masculine gender comprehends the two sexes, men include women, sons daughters,
and the singular often designates several persons or things.
16. Yiannopoulos, supra note 7.
17. Mitchell Franklin, Some Observations on the Influence of French Law on
the Early Civil Codes ofLouisiana, in Le Droit Civil Frangais-Livre Souvenir des
Journ6es du Droit Civil Frangais 841 (Le Barrdeau De Montreal 1936).
18. We shall see that, by contrast, the present revised code is directed to a
restricted audience-the legal profession. The Revision has accordingly attempted
to eliminate didactic materials and to make technical lawyers' law an annex of the
code. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text. According to Michael
McAuley, however, codes have a "teaching vocation" and the inclusion of didactic
materials such as examples and definitions should be one of the central ambitions
of modem redactors. Michael McAuley, The Pedagogical Code, 63 La. L. Rev
1293 (2004).
19. J.J. Morrison, The Needfora Revision ofthe Louisiana Civil Code, 11 Tul.
L. Rev. 213, 241 (1937). The famous interdictions to judges about the "d6ni de
justice" and "arrets de r6glement" are indeed found in the "livre pr~liminaire" of
the French Code (Arts. 4, 5) but these injunctions have a historic constitutional
purpose that is surely more than didactic.
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accessories of the civil law and the framers felt it was necessary to
incorporate a good deal of doctrine within the code itself. The judges
to whom these instructions issued were all trained in the common law
and would have brought with them a completely different
methodological inclination.2" Further, if the general effect of a more
explanatory code was to make it more accessible to the average
citizen, this too furthered a Napoleonic ideal.
The Digest particularly represented a striking departure from
French-style codification in dealing with past laws. The Digest did
not purport to repeal every past law touching the subject of private
law; it only repealed those parts of Spanish private law which were
specifically incompatible with its provisions. Accordingly, in contrast
to the Code Napolion, 2 the Digest made no definitive break with the
past and was never complete in its field. Code historian Richard
Kilbourne describes it as a kind of "restatement" of the essential
principles of the Spanish and Roman law.22 It left in place great
expanses of uncodified Spanish law on the same subject matter. It
was to be later realized that this extrinsic law could be controlling
whenever the Digest might treat a point with a general rule that was
not specific enough to oust a more precise Spanish rule on the same
subject. Such cases had to be decided by Spanish law rather than by
the Digest23 and this caused considerable legal uncertainty for many
years to come. The problem featured prominently in the reasons for
enacting a second code in 1825. Using unusually strong language,24
that Code declared the repeal of all former law in pari materia, but
20. Whether their inclinations and proclivities could be effectively tempered
by these pedagogic devices is another question. See Thomas Tucker, Interpretation
of the Louisiana Civil Codes, 1808-1840: The Failure of the Preliminary Title
(1972) (Thesis, Univ. of Glasgow). One study indicates that Art. 21-Louisiana's
famed "directory clause"about equity-was not successful in confining the judges
to its procedures. See Vernon Palmer, The Many Guises of Equity in a Mixed
Jurisdiction, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 7 (1994). The portrait of Louisiana judges sketched
by Symeon Symeonides shows them to be extraordinarily independent and creative
law makers who openly challenged the notion that all law is to be found in the
enactments of the Legislature. Symeon Symeonides, The Louisiana Judge: Judge,
Statesman, Politician, in Louisiana: Microcosm ofa Mixed Jurisdiction 89 (Vernon
Palmer ed., Carolina Acad. Press 1999).
21. The law of Ventose 30, Year XII abrogated every past law in the same
subject-matter category as the Code; that is, it repealed everything in Roman law,
French ordinances, general or local customs, statutes and regulations which
pertained to private law.
22. R.H. Kilbourne, A History of the Louisiana Civil Code: The Formative
Years, 1803-1839 69 (Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications Institute 1987).
23. The realization dawned with the famous case of Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart.(o.s.) 93 (La. 1817). It immediately prompted the Legislature to have all relevant
parts of the Siete Partidas translated into English. For details, see Palmer, supra
note 8, at 244-45.
24. Louisiana Civil Code article 3521 was drafted by the Legislature upon its
[Vol. 631076
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the judges found clever ways of keeping the moribund Spanish law
alive." Legal uncertainty persisted. The death blow was finally
delivered by the so-called Great Repealing Statute of 1828 which
expressly abrogated "all the civil laws which were in force before the
promulgation of the civil code lately promulgated.
2 6
The Louisiana codes again departed from the French approach
with respect to the question of recognized sources.27 The extreme
legal positivism of the Code Napolon that elevated legislation to the
status of the single source of law was not followed. Custom was
given its traditional place as a source of law. Interestingly, the
Louisiana jurisconsults in their projet recommended suppressing
custom altogether, in the belief that law ought to be the monopoly of
the Legislature. 28  The Legislature, however, was not nearly this
Benthamite and overruled their position. Louis Baudouin argues that
the Louisiana framers still displayed greater attachment for
legislation than in France.29  He views the famous statement in
Article 1 (1825), "[law is a solemn expression of legislative will"
("La Loi est une declaration solennelle de la volont6 ldgislative .. "),
to have been a bulwark against unwritten common law. This
statement in English (but not in French) reads as a ringing declaration
that legislation alone qualifies as law. Baudouin thought that,
consciously or not, it set up a barrier to intrusion of the Common law
and served as a mechanism of self-defense in a country surrounded
by Anglo-American jurisdictions.3"
own initiative and was probably added after the three jurists submitted their final
draft. Nevertheless, their Report of 1823 (at xcii) strongly recommended to the
Legislature "an express repeal of all former laws and usages" so the concept was
certainly theirs as well. Article 3521,which passed 26-2 in the House, provided as
follows:
From and after the promulgation of this code, the Spanish, Roman and
French laws which were in force in this state, when Louisiana was
ceded to the United States ... are hereby repealed in every case for
which it has been specially provided, and they shall not be invoked as
law, even under the pretence that their provisions are not contrary or
repugnant to those of this code.
25. See Cole's Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart. (n.s.) 41 (La. 1828).
26. 1828 La. Acts No. 160. Even this statute did not at first end the story. See
Reynolds v. Swain, 13 La. 193, 198 (1839).
27. Yiannopoulos, supra note 7, at 388.
28. In suppressing Article 3 of the Digest, they wrote, "Dire que les coutumes
ont force de la loi dans un pays oti toutes les lois sont icrites, nous parait un
contre-sens, "which was quoted from Symeon Symeonides, An Introduction to the
Louisiana Civil Law System 130 (2d ed. Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications
Institute 1983).
29. Louis Baudouin, The Influence of the Code Napoleon, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 21,
24 (1958).
30. If it ever was the barrier Baudouin thought it to be, it has since been torn
down by the 1987 revision. The revisers turned the principle into a platitude by
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1.3 The Controversy over "The Sources" of the Digest of 1808
There has been extended controversy as to why Louis Casimir
Moreau Lislet, who is usually regarded as the mastermind of the
Digest,a' turned so decisively toward French models. Spanish law
was considered the official law in force in Louisiana at that time and
his instructions were to follow the law in force.32 Superficially the
enactment appeared to be Spanish derived (and thus in compliance
with his instructions) since it was entitled, "A Digest of the Civil
Laws now in force in the territory of Orleans ... " (Emphasis added)
The mystery is how a code in which eighty-five percent of its
provisions were French-derived could be offered to the Louisiana
people as the equivalent of Spanish law. Was this "code"
inconsistent with the concept of a Digest of laws "now in force" and
incompatible with the author's instructions? This question has
produced more riddles than convincing answers.
Professor Batiza's pioneering efforts to trace the true "sources"
of the Digest ignited a controversy about his methodology and
findings.33 Professor Pascal dismisses Professor Batiza's research
as "purely philological" because in his view it does not trace the
substantive sources of the Digest, but dwells upon "word and
phrase" analysis. In Professor Pascal's words, "If this substance is
predominantly Spanish-Roman, then it does not matter that it is
expressed in terms French and English rather than Spanish and
Latin, or that the specific terms employed often were inspired by,
adapted from, or even copied from text on French or other systems
of law." '34
writing: "Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will." La. Civ. Code. art.
2 (1987).
31. James Brown was appointed co-drafter with Moreau, but Brown's
contribution, if any, is not clear. Some historians, such as Professor Batiza and,
more cautiously, Thomas Tucker, believe that Moreau worked alone. This view is
based upon the statement in the Report of 1823 referring to the "unaided exertions
of one person" in confecting the Digest. Sources, supra note 11, at 28. On the
other hand, Cairns finds the sole authorship theory to be improbable and
unconvincing. Supra note 13, at 110. For details of Louis Moreau Lislet's life and
a vigorous defense against slights to his integrity, see Alain Levasseur, Louis
Casimir Elisabeth Moreau-Lislet: Foster Father of Louisiana Civil Law (LSU Law
Center Publications Institute 1996).
32. The instructions from the legislature were to "make the civil law by which
the territory is now governed the ground work of said code." Res. of June 7, 1806,
Terr. of Orleans Acts 215 (1806).
33. See Robert Pascal, Sources of the Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor
Batiza, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 603 (1972). See also Joseph Modeste Sweeney,
Tournament ofScholars over the Sources of the Civil Code of 1808,46 Tul. L. Rev.
585 (1972).
34. Pascal, supra note 32, at 606.
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In fairness, Professor Batiza did not actually ignore the
conceptual or substantive origins of provisions, for as he points out,
"The language of provisions... of necessity embodies concepts or
principles.... ." His methodology distinguished between the direct
source (a text which was simply copied verbatim or paraphrased
almost verbatim) and an indirect source (a text which was not so
copied or paraphrased but had similar essential content). He showed
that French texts were the direct source of more than 1400 articles in
the Digest, but he acknowledged that many Spanish texts were
substantively concordant and could be regarded as indirect sources
of the same provision." Professor Yiannopoulos has considered the
issue of whether Batiza's use of the word "sources" to denote the
works from which legislative provisions were taken is "legitimate."
The eminent author agrees that this usage is legitimate and indeed
that it is commonly employed among legal historians.36
Nevertheless, the debate has become bogged down in conflicting
claims with no resolution in sight, and my purpose in the next
paragraphs is to clarify the issues as much as possible and then to
suggest new lines of inquiry that can advance the debate.
1.4 A Few Clarifications and Three New Directions
It is incontrovertible that a large number of articles were in fact
taken bodily-linguistically and structurally-from French models
and used in both nineteenth century codes. Is this enough to
constitute a reception of French law? In regard to the Digest much
debate has been devoted to inconclusive side issues, such as the
question whether the enactment should be properly called a 'code'
rather than a 'digest,' 37 whether the redactors had a positivist outlook
35. See Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and
Speculation: A Rejoinder, 46 Tul. L. Rev. 628, 630-39 (1972).
36. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Early Sources of Louisiana Law: Critical
Appraisal of a Controversy, in Louisiana's Legal Heritage 98, 102 (Edward Haas
ed., Perdido 1983). In this paper, rather than take sides in the fray, I will simply use
the word "sources" (in a way acceptable, I believe, to all sides) to refer at a
linguistic level to those prior texts which served as the French language model for
the Louisiana codes.
37. Battle is engaged over this point because if in the redactors' own minds
they felt restricted to producing a digest, this would suggest they intended simply
to replicate the existing Castilian law and not deviate from it. To claim that the
product was in reality a code would imply that the drafters exercised some choice
over the content and could borrow, adapt, and invent provisions as they pleased,
which suits Professor Batiza's position. John Cairns believes it suits Professor
Pascal's position to insist that it is a digest because this supports the view that it
must embody Castilian law irrespective of its textual origins. Cairns believes
Pascal's reasoning is basically circular, i.e., "since only Spanish sources were used,
the 1808 redaction is a "digest;" that it is a "digest" proves that only Spanish
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or followed natural law thinking,38 whether the redactors abused their
discretion and violated their instructions, whether they intended to
use French law as a proxy for Spanish, and of course a special
fascination about the role and meaning of the de la Vergne volume.39
sources were used." Cairns, supra, at 86.
38. Cairns, supra note 13, at 76-81. This point is stressed by Cairns. In his
view, Pascal assumes that the general orientation of the redactors would be that of
the positivist theory-they would feel free to examine only those sources formally
in force. Other sources would have no validity because they lacked the sanction of
the sovereign. Since Spanish law was never formally abrogated either by the
Spanish or the Louisianians, the redactors were following Castilian law at a
substantive level, because the sovereign had not authorized the introduction of
French law. The logical mistake, says Cairns, is to attribute a positivistic outlook
to the redactors when in fact they, like so many lawyers and judges of that time,
were imbued with natural law thinking. Natural law conceived of law in universal
rather than national terms. It led to the view that the "civil law" transcended
national legal systems and was supra-national. Id. at 76. The prevalence of natural
law thinking explains why the redactors of the Digest were so cosmopolitan in
accepting texts from Blackstone, Domat, Gaius, and Pothier; why the preliminary
title refers the judge directly to "natural law and reason" when positive law is silent
(Art. 21 Dig. of 1808); and why the custom developed, and continued even after
enactment of the Digest and Code, of citing authorities and writers from any part
of Europe as persuasive authority in Louisiana. If natural law concepts informed
legal thinking in this period, then the instructions to the redactors to make "the civil
law by which the territory is now governed the ground work of said code" would
be referring to an international civil law and would have entailed discretion to go
beyond Spanish law to other sources. See supra note 32.
39. This designation refers to Moreau Lislet's personal copy of the Digest of
1808 in which he purports to list, in hand-annotated entries on interleaved sheets,
the sources of the provisions. Known as the de la Vergne volume (after the family
which possessed and preserved it) the volume is bound with interleaves containing
citation references in manuscript to various laws and commentaries. The title sheet
states "Loix de l'Etat de la Louisiane avec des notes qui referent aux Loix civiles
et Espagnoles qui y ont rapport. 1814." Though dated 1814, internal evidence
within the volume actually shows some annotations were added as late as 1817.
See Art. 27, at 43. The plan of the author is stated in the handwritten "Avant-
Propos." On the interleaved pages facing the English text, the author says he is
providing a list of references to Roman and Spanish law which have general
relevance to the subject of the chapter of the Digest. In contrast, on the pages
facing the French text, he says he is placing citations to the specific laws of diverse
codes from which the articles in the chapter were taken ("d'oi sont tir~es les
dispositions de notre statut local"). The puzzling fact, however, is that despite the
great number and variety of listed citations, there is not a single mention of the
Projet du Gouvernement of 1800 nor the Code Napoleon, though research
convincingly shows these were the direct verbal sources for more than 1400
articles. This omission has caused much confusion as to whether Moreau Lislet was
listing his sources, hiding his sources, or simply making a table of concordances to
Spanish and Roman law only. See Sweeney, supra note 33, at 599-600. J. M.
Sweeney argued that since Moreau used the ambiguous words "notre statut local"
that he was only providing sources of "our local status" rather than of the Digest
itself.
Professor Baade speculates that Moreau could not publicly acknowledge the
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These interesting points, however, are somewhat secondary in
attempting to gauge whether there was a substantive reception of
French law. I believe the focus should move to three other points
which will be simply summarized here and then discussed more fully
below. The first point is that the only type of investigation which all
sides would accept as meaningful has not been carried out. We have
never had the benefit of a comprehensive, side-by-side comparison
of the substantive differences between Castilian law and the
borrowed provisions in the Digest. A comprehensive comparison
would be the best means of assessing the amount of French law
admitted into Louisiana by the Digest.4° For obvious reasons, no
detailed comparison of this kind is ever likely to be attempted. The
present writer submits, however, that a highly efficient method of
pointing out the substantive differences has been at hand since
Moreau's day, or since the discovery of the de la Vergne volume (and
its facsimiles), but it has been overlooked and thus not used by prior
investigators. The present study applies this method to a number of
subj ect-matter areas, some of which were previously researched, and
concludes that the substantive differences are far larger than
previously known or shown. The present research will indicate the
equivalent of Moreau's own admission of his substantive
borrowings from French sources, so he created the de la Vergne volume to provide
a "positive law alibi" for himself. See Baade, supra note 3, at 84. John Cairns'
theory as to the role and purpose of the manuscript is more persuasive. He believes
that the real reason for the volume's existence was tied to the revival of Castilian
law in the period 1812-1817. See Cairns, supra note 13. Compiling a list of
Spanish references article by article was a way to win cases by citing Castilian law
on point. Moreau Lislet was in a position to execute such a work and had such a
need in his law practice. Additional copies were made for other practitioners. This
would explain why somewhat similar annotated versions have been found in
various libraries (for instance, the Henri Raphael Denis copy in the Tulane Law
Library) and also why, though the work is dated 1814, it received updates as late
as 1817. See Darby & McDonald, infra note 44, at 1211. Finally, it agrees with the
present discovery about the volume, namely that there are 645 articles with omitted
cross-references, which shows that the entire focus was on referencing
Spanish/Roman law, not on providing an exhaustive list of sources. This
practitioner orientation further explains why Moreau would go to the trouble to
compile a thirty page index of "principal words" (in French only) at the end of the
volume that is far more detailed than the original printed index. The reason,
according to Cairns, why no French sources are cited is because no one doubted
that French law was the principal source of the Digest provisions themselves. The
practical aim was to relate the Digest back to Spanish law. See Cairns, supra note
13, at 661-64.
40. As to the Code of 1825, however, we shall see that these questions have
little pertinence since the instructions gave maximum latitude to change the law as
the redactors saw fit, and they explicitly informed the Legislature of their intent to
borrow from the French codes and writers. See infra note 62 and accompanying
text.
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indebtedness to French sources in nearly thirty percent of the Digest
articles. Of course this discovery cannot resolve how much French
content may exist in the other seventy percent of the Digest articles.
No doubt debate will continue about Moreau's loose and associative
way of cross-referencing to Spanish law and the extent to which this
may have concealed (not necessarily purposefully) the extent of the
reception. Nevertheless, the conclusion is inescapable that a broad
substantive reception of French law took place when French models
were introduced into the Digest.
The second point is that the controversial claims and conjectures
surrounding the Digest have been incorrectly projected upon later
codes and legal periods. I shall attempt to show they do not apply in
the altered circumstances of the Civil Code of 1825. From the
perspective of a much clearer historical record we can see that an
intensified reception of French law was planned and carried out by
the redactors. The evidence refutes the view that French models were
treated as fungibles or substitutes for Spanish law.
The third point is to note that the "perception" that our civil code
is essentially French and not Spanish has prevailed for the past 150
years. That perception is now as important as the now-discarded
'Spanish' perception once was to judges in the first quarter of the
19th century. The modem perception has created its own
interpretative reality out of which objective consequences have
flowed. One of these has been an interactive relationship with French
law, not Spanish law.
1.4.1 Substantive Comparisons
As mentioned previously, whether the French appropriations in
the Digest caused substantive deviations from existing Castilian law
is a basic issue at the core of the debate. Substantive comparisons
would provide the best proof of the degree to which, if any, there was
a reception of distinctly French ideas in 1808 or only a reception of
French form instead. For understandable reasons no comprehensive
comparative study of this kind has ever been attempted. There is
prior research in a few substantive areas which indicates that the
redactors did depart from the substance of Spanish law, but the proof
has not been quantitatively convincing. To this research I will add
my own, using a method which allows us to envision the areas where
borrowed French law had no Spanish counterpart or actually
contradicted Spanish law. Before turning to these points, however,
it is important to describe the various levels at which substantive
comparisons between French and Spanish law can be made.
We might think of the substantive divergence between Spanish
and French law on an ascending scale: the first and lowest level is
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one of minor and incidental dissimilarity; somewhat higher is the level
of under-inclusive and over-inclusive provisions where in various
respects Castilian law and borrowed rules do not substantively match;
and the highest level is that of directly incompatible provisions where
the borrowed law clashes with Castilian substantive law. Let us
discuss each of these more closely.
The first level need not detain us long. Clearly the existing Spanish
law often possessed and expressed concepts and rules roughly
coextensive in substance with French law, but these were approximate
expressions which, even when concordant and coextensive, could not
match the exact conceptual structure of the borrowed French wording.
One will routinely find small differences in the contours of rules, the
emphasis or the phrasing, and inevitably small substantive differences
arise at an interstitial level. But this is a minor level of deviation. It
would hardly support the thesis that a major reception of French
substantive law took place.
As we move up to the second level, however, substantive
discrepancies between French and Spanish law have greater probative
value for the Pascal/Batiza debate. There are two kinds of divergences
at this level: (a) a relevant Spanish provision may be under-inclusive
(only correspond to a certain segment of the borrowed rules),' or (b)
the relevant Castilian law may be over-inclusive (Castilian law12 f
contains more segments than the borrowed rule). In the famous case
of Cottin v. Cottin/3 Spanish law was overinclusive. An unrepealed
Castilian provision dating to the 14th century was controlling.
Large amounts of Spanish law were "different" in the sense of
being more inclusive than the borrowed French law, but these
41. Castilian rules disqualifying women from public office would furnish a
simple example. These were less inclusive than the French-derived rules of the
Digest. The Digest of 1808 states .... . women are, by their sex alone, rendered
incapable ... thus, for example women cannot exercise the offices of magistrate or
representative nor have they a right to elect or to be elected representatives of the
people." Bk. I, Tit. I, Art. 2, p.8. According to Professor Batiza, this text originates
in Domat. See Batiza, supra note 11, at 46. According to the de la Vergne volume,
comparable Spanish rules are found in the Partidas: see Part. 3, t. 4, 1.4 and Part.
4, t. 23, 1. 2. The Spanish rules, however, disqualify women less categorically and
in fewer situations. They exclude women from the office of judge or magistrate
(with an exception if she is a queen, countess, or other noble), and do not
disqualify women from being voters or as representatives of the people, as the
Digest provision does. The scope of the French rule goes well beyond that of the
cited Spanish provision.
42. When Spanish law was overinclusive, Moreau did not have to worry about
the problem of substantive deviation. So long as the French borrowing was
narrower, he knew that any extra segments of Spanish law were not repealed and
could be used to supplement the article.
43. 5 Mart. (o.s.) 93 (La. 1817). This case is discussed in context in Palmer,
supra note 8, at 244-45.
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differences produced no repugnancy and did not lead to their repeal
under a digest system. They remained available to supplement the
Digest and to decide particular cases. For that reason the existence of
over-inclusive Spanish rules can provide no evidence of a reception
of French substantive law.
In contrast, however, when Spanish law was underinclusive in
relation to the French borrowing, every extra segment of the broader
French rule amounted to a change in the existing law since it was
new and without counterpart in Castilian law. This could reach
dramatic proportions in cases where Spanish law was radically
underinclusive. Radical underinclusiveness describes the situation
where Spanish law has nothing at all to say on the subject matter
introduced by the borrowed rules. In that instance the borrowed
French rules could concern a peculiarly French institution, or an
original concept or procedure developed by French redactors for
which the Castilian law has no counterpart. To introduce such laws
into Louisiana was to import laws that Spain did not recognize. The
question arises: Did such areas actually exist? And how can we find
them?
These areas are systematically illuminated by an unusual feature
of the de la Vergne volume which previous investigators have not
noted nor discussed.' I am referring to Moreau Lislet's pervasive
and systematic use of omissions. Moreau left blank spaces next to
645 articles of the Digest."5 The Digest contains only 2160 articles.
This means, therefore, that in nearly thirty percent of the provisions
he listed no sources or cross-references at all. In his Avant-Propos
Moreau carefully described the meaning of his cross-references to
Spanish and Roman laws but he did not mention that he was leaving
any articles blank. Hence there is no explanation as to what a blank
signifies. It is very likely that Moreau expects the book's user to
44. This oversight is remarkable because the volume, or similar versions of it,
has received considerable attention and study. See Robert Pascal, A Recent
Discovery: A Copy ofthe "Digest of the Civil Laws " of 1808 with Marginal Source
References in Moreau Lislet's Hand, 26 La. L. Rev. 25 (1965); Mitchell Franklin,
An Important Document in the History ofAmerican Roman and Civil Law: The de
la VergneManuscript, 33 Tul. L. Rev. 35 (1958); Joseph Dainow, Moreau Lislet's
Notes on Sources of Louisiana Civil Code of 1808, 19 La. L. Rev. 43 (1958); L.
Darby, III & T. McDonald, Jr., A Recent Discovery: Another Copy of Moreau
Lislet's Annotations to the Civil Code of 1808, 47 Tul. L. Rev. 1210 (1972); see
also Thomas Tucker, Sources of Louisiana's Law of Persons: Blackstone, Domat
and the French Codes, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 264, 266 n.8 (1970).
45. Professor Dainow seriously underestimated the number ofthese omissions.
In his description he stated, "Only here and there does an article appear with no
citation at all." See Dainow, supra note 44, at 50. This is perhaps why he
overlooked their significance. The other authors, excepting Tucker, fail to make any
mention of these omissions. See supra note 44.
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know what a blank meant and what role it played in his system of
citations. Of one thing we may be sure, however, he cannot be
saying that these provisions have no source or that he himself does
not know their sources or has forgotten them. As redactor, he knows
very well from where they were taken, and we too, with the aid of
Professor Batiza's research, are in a position to fill in the blanks as
easily as Moreau. They turn out to be predominantly French, and of
course never Spanish.46
Why then, we may ask, did he not simply provide these French
references instead of leaving a blank? Because the entire purpose of
the volume has a Spanish/Roman focus and Moreau's intended
audience is aware of that purpose. It was never his plan in the de la
Vergne volume to provide a complete list of sources or authorities.
The blank references are a confession that French sources are
intentionally suppressed, since Moreau withholds citing French law
when it is the only possible source available to him. His purpose is
only to provide a list of Spanish and Roman authorities with "quelque
rapport" to the articles of the Digest. The blank references indicate
articles which have "aucun rapport" or relevance to Roman-Spanish
law. The blanks are Moreau Lislet's own designation of his non-
Spanish sources.
Interestingly, these blanks are not randomly or evenly distributed.
They form concentrated pockets around particular subjects within the
private law.47 There are no fewer than 20 clusters of omissions
within particular Titles of the Digest. The existence of a cluster is
closely tied to subject matter. To illustrate, there are 25 blank
sources next to the articles on party walls and other related
servitudes, 48 18 blanks for articles on the interdiction and curatorship
of incapable persons,49 12 blanks for tutorship over minors,
undertutors, and the duties of the family council, ° 26 blanks for
absent persons,51 and 36 blanks for the provisions on vacant
46. As mentioned earlier, the significance attributed to the blank references
should not be taken to suggest that cross-referenced Spanish authorities in the other
seventy percent of the Digest should be credited as authentic substantive sources.
That conclusion simply goes beyond the scope and findings of this paper. It is not
clear that Moreau himself believed that the full extent of French sources was
captured in the blank articles only.
47. A complete Tableau showing Moreau's omissions is appendixed in Palmer,
supra note 6, at 317-37.This same scheme of omissions is found, article for article
and blank for blank, in the Moreau Lislet volume owned by Henri Raphael Denis
which was discovered in the Tulane Law Library. See Darby & McDonald, supra
note 44, at 1211.
48. See Digest of 1808, Book II, Tit. 4, Chs. 2-3, pp 129-135.
49. See Digest of 1808, Book I, Tit. 9, Ch. 1, pp 79-83.
50. See Digest of 1808, Book I, Tit. 8, Ch. 1, pp 63-67.
51. See Digest of 1808, Book I, Tit. 3, Ch. 2, pp 15-23.
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successions.52 When we recall the origins of these institutions, the
reason for the omitted references becomes perfectly clear. Party
walls, undertutors, and the family council are all indigenous French
ideas unknown to Spanish or Roman law;5 3 vacant successions and
absent persons (subjects resting partly on French customary law and
fully remodeled in the Code Napoleon) were barely known or dealt
with in Castilian law.
4
Using Moreau's system of blank entries as a key or entry point
into the Digest, the present writer conducted research into Spanish
and French law with a view to confirming whether the theory just
presented holds true. It was found that the provisions with blank
sources point directly to French rules and institutions which are
indeed "legal blanks" in Spanish law. The provisions of the Digest
on 'party walls' and 'common enclosures' furnish a clear illustration.
There are blanks next to some twenty-five articles devoted to this
subject because the rules on party walls originated in the old walled
French cities under the northern customs and were not part of
Castilian law.55 The redactors took five of these articles from the
Coutume de Paris and the rest were taken from the French Projet
(1800) and the Code Napolion (1804).56 The blank references
regarding absent persons are due to a similar reason. The law in
France had been a jumbled mass of local usages, jurisprudence,
customs and royal ordonnance. The French code drafters
consolidated and remodeled this material in their first draft, and after
discussions in the Conseil d'Etat, it received several further
redactions. M. Bigot-Pr6ameneu, in presenting the finished product
52. See Digest of 1808, Book III, Tit. 1, Ch. 7, pp 173-185.
53. See infra note 55, at 109-12.
54. Of course not every blank necessarily means a borrowing of indigenous
French law. Some of the articles may have been the original invention of the
French or the Louisiana redactors, or may have been taken from a common law
source such as Blackstone. Thomas Tucker in his study of the sources of the law
of persons was at one point on the verge of reaching this conclusion. "Ironically,"
he wrote, "the absence of cited authority for an article proved a fairly consistent
indication that the article was either an original work, or that its source was the
common law." See Tucker, supra note 44, at 266 n.8.
55. See M. Berlier, Conseiller d'Etat, Exposi des Motifs du Code Napolion,
Speech 190-96 (Jan. 20, 1804) (1810) (Gaunt reprint 2001). This origin is
confirmed by Professor Yiannopoulos. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise: Predial Servitudes § 66 (2d ed. 1997). ("In walled French towns
during the Middle Ages . . . economies of space and construction compelled
utilization of fences and ditches as common enclosures of adjoining estates, and of
walls as common supports of adjoining buildings. This led to the development of
customary law dealing with common enclosures. The detailed rules of the Custom
of Paris and of the Custom of Orleans in this field proved most influential in the
drafting of the Code Napolgon and of the Louisiana Civil Code.")
56. Batiza, supra note 11, at 69.
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to the Corps Ldgislatif, called it something "newly created."" That
is another way to say an original set of provisions. The use of
inventions of this kind cannot be explained away as French verbiage
replicating Spanish ideas. Rather, it is a genuine reception of
indigenous French law into a Digest supposed by some to be
consecrated to Spanish law. Moreau's blank source references in 645
articles are his own demonstration of the degree to which the Digest
is authentically French.
We come now to the third and highest level of differences. Here
the two laws will sometimes be substantively contradictory or
repugnant and hence the borrowed French provisions would effect a
repeal of existing law. Clearly under Professor Pascal's theory,
Moreau should have avoided this type of antagonism as much as
possible. Yet the evidence would suggest otherwise. On the one
hand, instances of incompatibility can be found even when Moreau
indicated a Castilian cross-reference for a French-derived'article. On
the other hand, the possibility that an incompatibility may be found
increases when he left the source blank. A clear illustration is the
Digest's declaration in Article 40 (Bk. HI, Tit. 2, Ch. 4) that
"[s]ubstitutions and fidei commissa are and remain prohibited."
Moreau was wise to leave a blank next to Article 40 since Partidas
VI, Title V expressly permitted substitutions. The Digest prohibition
was actually taken from the Code Napolgon (substitutions
fideicommissaire were abolished in France in 1792) so the Digest
provision flatly contradicted (and abrogated) Partidas VI, Title V. 8
Turning briefly to the example of marriage contracts, the scheme
of omitted references in the de la Vergne volume lends support to the
detailed research of Professor Hans Baade. His research
demonstrates that the Digest redactors adopted the French
"contractual" model of matrimonial property rather than the Castilian
"statutory" model. The French folk custom of making marriage
contracts to govern future transmissions of wealth between spouses
was recognized under the Custom of Paris and it was carried to
Louisiana. That custom, as shown by the notarial records, remained
57. P.A. Fenet, Recueil Complet des travaux pr~paratoires du Code Civil 462
(Zeller reprint, Osnabruck 1968) (1827).
58. Moreau Lislet and Carleton did not deem it necessary to translate Title V
of the Sixth Partida on "Substitutions" on the ground that it was repealed by the
Digest and was not in force in Louisiana. They explained in a footnote that
"[s]ubstitutions have been abrogated by the civil code [sic], as well as fidei
commissa. C, art. 4, [sic] p. 216." The Laws ofLas Siete Partidas Which Are Still
in Force in the State of Louisiana, vol 11 1008 (L. Moreau Lislet & H. Carleton,
trans., James M'Karaher ed., 1820). See Ronald Scalise, Prohibited Substitutions:
Louisiana's Experience with a French Institution, 48 Loy. L. Rev. 715,727 (2002);
John Tucker, Jr., Substitutions, Fideicommissa and Trusts in Louisiana Law: A
Semantical Reappraisal, 24 La. L. Rev. 439, 470 (1964).
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alive in Louisiana after introduction of Spanish law and even after the
cession of the territory to the United States. Castile had no equivalent
custom. Indeed the interspousal donations presupposed in such
contracts were "directly contrary" to Castilian law which treated
them as invalid unless accomplished by will and testament."9 This
substantive incompatibility was already signaled in the de la Vergne
annotations: Moreau can give no Spanish cross-references for five
of the relevant articles.' Once again this suggests that Moreau's
system of omissions leads research to the correct starting point. John
Cairns' research points out that two important areas of family law in
the Digest-the concepts of puissance maritale and puissance
paternelle---differ from those of Castilian law as they are founded in
the northern French droit coutumier." The Louisiana Supreme Court
too has noted that in some cases the cross-references to Castilian law
in the de la Vergne manuscript are directly contrary to the text of the
Digest.62
A full study of French/Spanish incompatibilities has yet to be
made, but it is fair to say that the list of Spanish cross-references in
the de la Vergne manuscript includes contradictory references and
cannot pass for a set of "sources." The articles with blank cross-
references in Moreau Lislet's list also contain contradictory material
and further study may well reveal that those articles contain the
largest cache of it. The overall point is that the decision to follow the
French model did lead to considerable deviation away from Spanish
law, even if the degree is variable and the overall extent is yet to be
determined. For reasons of both substance and form, the Digest was
a significant step toward a general reception of French law in
Louisiana. It was the prelude to a far deeper reception of French law
in the second Louisiana Civil Code.
The discovery of Moreau's omissions allows us to understand
that Moreau was not hiding his French sources nor seeking to
establish an alibi for himself. His scheme of omissions indicates he
is candid with himself and respectful of history. It was a failure to
understand his system which led some to question his integrity, but
also led others to believe in a Spanish purity he never intended.
59. See Baade, supra note 3, at 87.
60. See arts. 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, p. 325.
61. See Cairns, supra note 13, at 630.
62. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 55, at 98, who cites several Louisiana
Supreme Court opinions stating that Moreau Lislet's references to Spanish law
"contradict" the provision in question or "bear little resemblance in text and
substance to the Louisiana code article adopted. ... " See Dickson v. Sandefur, 250
So. 2d 708, 717 (La. 1971); Holland v. Buckley, 305 So. 2d 113, 119 (La. 1974).
Thomas Tucker similarly found that the Spanish authorities cited proved to be, at
best, only obliquely related to a given article and often totally irrelevant. See
Tucker, supra note 44, at 266.
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1.4.2 The Code of 1825: A Fresh Reception with Openly-
Stated French Appropriations
The historical record surrounding the second Louisiana
codification is much improved over the record surrounding the first.
It contains statements of the redactors' goals and philosophy, their
view about the position of the judge, their motives, their sources, and
their views on foreign systems. These views are found in three
documentary forms: the Commissioners's Preliminary Report to the
Legislature 1823; their Projet setting forth proposed amendments,
deletions and additions; and finally their comments and sources
intercalated between the new articles of the Projet. This record
indicates that the redactors intended a new start with a bold repeal of
prior law and fresh reception of French law.
It will be recalled that the two jurists who produced the Digest
had precise instructions to make "the existing laws the groundwork"
of their effort, but the three redactors of the Code of 1825 were given
far greater latitude. The Legislature placed no restrictions on the
contents of the Code nor on the strain of civil law they were to
follow. In the Joint Resolution of March 14, 1822 the
Commissioners were authorized "to revise the civil code by
amending the same in such manner as they will deem it advisable..
"63 The same charges of infidelity to mandate, therefore, cannot be
leveled at the Commissioners as they once were leveled at the authors
of the Digest. Whatever the amount of borrowed law, or its national
stripe, its use would have been consistent with their charter. This
immediately distinguishes the circumstances surrounding the Code
from the Digest. There is no reason to conflate the two situations as
if they were similar or to carry over old arguments from one situation
to the other. The great freedom of choice given to the drafters of the
Code has significance for Professor Pascal's point that in 1808
Moreau Lislet may have intended to express Spanish concepts via
verbatim borrowings from France. That is perhaps relevant as a
theory to explain how Moreau intended to fulfill his original
instructions, but the theory loses all relevance in the case of the Code
of 1825. "Moreau II" was not facing the limitations he faced as
"Moreau I." Moreau I was given narrower instructions and left
behind almost no trace of his French appropriations. Moreau II and
his fellow Commissioners, however, enjoyed a wide-open mandate
which permitted them unfettered discretion to go beyond existing
law. They responded with an open disclosure of sources and
borrowings. They dropped the word Digest as a descriptive title and
63. See Acts Passed at the Second Session of the Fifth Legislature, at 108 (J.C.
De St. Romes 1822) (emphasis added).
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called the work a Code. They informed the Legislature through their
Preliminary Report that they planned to borrow from French law:
"[T]he comprehensive Codes of France," they wrote, "are so many
rich mines from which we can draw treasures of Legislation."64 Their
attitude toward the Code Napoldon is one of unbounded admiration:
"In the Napoleon Code, that rich Legacy which the expiring Republic
gave to France and to the world, we have a system approaching
nearer to perfection than any which preceded it."'65 Their Report,
incidentally, is imbued with distinctly French attitudes towards
judges. They express the same suspicion of robed power that
pervaded French thinking after the Revolution. They accordingly
embrace the radical French version of separation of powers which
would deprive the judges of power to make precedents even for cases
of "construction." As in France, they wished to require the judges to
report regularly to the Legislature to explain their decisions.66
Enthusiasm for these exaggerated ideas may be taken as a sign of
their warmness for French civil law.
In addition to their Preliminary Report, the redactors left behind
an expos6 des motifs in which they openly identified their
borrowings. The expos6 des motifs I am referring to is the set of
comments and references inserted in small print between the Projet
articles. 67 These comments indicate in many cases the individual and
particular sources to the new code articles. This list is an eclectic
blend of Spanish, Roman, and French authorities, but the vast
majority are French. There are articles attributed to Febrero and the
Partidas, but a much greater number are attributed to Pothier, the
"Code Franais," and even post-code commentators like Toullier,
Maleville, and Pardessus. In contrast to the privately-maintained and
retroactively-executed notations in the de la Vergne volume, these
motifs were contemporaneous with the redaction and were intended
for the legislature's information. In addition, unlike that volume, the
French references are in the open.
In making a comparison between the redaction of the Code and
the Digest, it is interesting to consider who wrote these notes.
According to Colonel Tucker's deductions, Moreau Lislet was the
principal author of Book I of the 1825 Civil Code. Professor Batiza's
64. See Report from E. Livingston, Moreau Lislet, & P. Derbigny to the Senate
& House of Representatives of Louisiana (Feb. 13, 1823), in 1 La. Legal Archives,
Project of the Civil Code of 1825, at x (1937).
65. Id. at lxxxix.
66. Id. at xcii.
67. See 1 La. Legal Archives, Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 (1937).
Professor Batiza takes the similar view that the Report of 1823, together with the
references and comments in the Projet, fulfilled the essential purposes of an exposg
des motifs. See Batiza, supra note 11, at 2.
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opinion is that he played a far greater role, that he was the probable
author of both Books I and I as well as the first two titles of Book
II, leaving Edward Livingston responsible for the rest of Book 1I.6'
If Moreau was indeed the principal author of Books I and LI, then it
is probably correct to assume that he penned the pertinent notes in the
expose which accompanied those provisions. 9 The great majority of
the comments in this expos6 (there are 346 in all) are concentrated in
the first two books and the first portion of the third book, which
corresponds to Batiza's view of Moreau's contribution.70 Even if we
cannot pinpoint individual authorship of the comments, Moreau is,
at the very least, participating in a transparent method.7 The
inscrutable trail which the erstwhile author of the Digest left has been
replaced by a method that seeks to identify sources and to reveal
reasons for selecting them. The new approach is consistent with
instructions that allowed freedom to choose among different laws.
Such choices need to be shown and justified to fellow team members
and legislators.72
68. See J. Tucker, Jr., Foreword, in 1 La. Legal Archives, Project of the Civil
Code of 1825, at viii (1937); Batiza, supra note 11, at 4-5.
69. Yet since it was a team effort, attribution is not positive. It is possible that
Moreau Lislet drafted the comments to Book I (and possibly Book II) and made
amendments in accordance with suggestions from Derbigny and Livingston. That
at least was the advance plan stated in the Report of 1823: "This, [the writing of
comments] although originally the sole work of that one of us to whom the
consideration of that part of the Code was assigned, in our division of the labor, will
be discussed by all; and when finally modified or agreed to, will be submitted with
the entire work, to the consideration of the Legislature." See supra note 64, at xciv.
70. After the third title of Book III to the end of the 1825 Code, source cites for
particular articles are no longer stated in the notes. The number and style of the
comments changes abruptly, and this may reflect the stage at which Livingston
became the principal redactor.
71. It is important to notice that by this time Moreau is an establishment figure.
He is no longer the newcomer to Louisiana whose position is unassured and whose
knowledge of Spanish law is limited to two years of practice. By 1823 he had
served as a judge, a Senator, member of the House, Attorney General, and had
continued a flourishing practice. Besides this, he had written an explanation of the
criminal laws of Orleans in 1806, drafted the Digest of 1808, translated (with
Carleton) Las Siete Partidas into English in 1819, and besides co-authorship of the
Civil Code of 1825, would go on to prepare the Code of Practice of 1825 with
Livingston. His knowledge of Spanish, French, Roman, and Louisiana law must
have vastly increased by that time.
72. It is true that this list of sources is "unevenly distributed" as Professor
Batiza says. See Batiza, supra note 11, at 3. Furthermore, as already noted, the
redactors did not bother to list any sources for the old Digest provisions brought
forward, and quite a few French materials are purloined without attribution. See 1
La. Legal Archives, Project of the Civil Code of 1825, 235-37, 264-75, 346-47
(1937). This may be because each redactor was responsible for his own comments
and the execution was simply inconsistent. Nevertheless, there is enough cohesion
and accuracy to make the point that their method sought transparency, distinguished
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Two examples at random will illustrate the method in operation.
In adding a series of rules on successions, the Commissioners first
suppressed some previous Spanish rules dealing with
"representation" in the collateral line (citing to the Partidas and the
Recopilacirn) because they were "contrary to the spirit of our
government." The Commissioners then substituted articles which,
the exposd des motifs says, were taken from the "Code Franvais," a
statement which is accurate. 3 In another place, the drafters added
provisions on property boundaries, stating that the provisions were
taken from "Thoulier" [sic], a statement that is well-founded.
Professor Batiza's research confirms Toullier was the "almost
verbatim" source of these articles.74 This was, at least, the recurrent
pattern whenever new material was brought into the Code,
particularly in Books I and II. The redactors gave no sources at all
for articles of the Digest that were being retained. It is therefore
beyond cavil that whenever they referenced particular French works
or Spanish works, they considered these to be the "source" itself of
the article and not a proxy for another source. The references are
straightforwardly accurate, not like the cites in the de la Vergne
manuscript which have been characterized as "oblique," "irrelevant,"
or "contradictory."75 In my view, therefore, the drafters engaged in
openly stated appropriations from Spanish, French, and Roman
sources. It is implausible to argue that a reference to, say, Toullier is
meant to be merely formal, not substantive, whereas a reference to
Febrero is meant to be substantive. There is not the slightest
evidence of any substance/form distinction in their method. The
Preliminary Report promised they would draw upon "treasures of
legislation" from many rich mines, and in light of that announcement,
they would have no reason to disguise their intentions or hide their
sources.
If we put aside polemical positions and examine their notion of
sources on the basis of what was said in the Preliminary Report and
Exposg, the picture is clear. The Commissioners actually extracted
ore from the mines they indicated. They in fact took far more from
France than anywhere else, but this was consistent with their
carefully between French and Spanish sources, and betrayed no desire to pour
Spanish wine in French bottles, much less to mingle Bordeaux with Rioja. The
bottles and wines are segregated and marked and, in most cases, Professor Batiza's
independent historical research confirms the labels.
73. See 1 La. Legal Archives, Project of the Civil Code of 1825 at 108-11.
74. Id. at 96-97; see Batiza, supra note 11, at 47.
75. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Professor Batiza, with his usual
meticulousness, points to several exceptions where there were inaccuracies, and
these lead him "to wonder what the purpose was in concealing or omitting the
actual source" in the Projet. See Batiza, supra note 11, at 8. I do not share his
suspicion that there is any intentional concealment.
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instructions and their announced intentions, and the Legislature was
well advised of those intentions.76
1.4.3 The "French Perception"
It may have indeed been Moreau I's subjective intent to use
French law as a proxy for Spanish law, but that intent did not bind
later interpreters who were unaware of that intent. Generally, lawyers
are literal-minded positivists who accept the provenance of code
articles at face value. If they know that an exact set of words was
devised by a French legislator or author and that the Louisiana
redactor has literally transcribed the text, then the form and the
content of the borrowing will be regarded as French. Their
perception is not influenced by hidden intent. In consequence,
sharing the same texts with France-as opposed to simply sharing
underlying concepts and rules with Spain-forged a strong bond with
France and caused prior Spanish connections to wither. There is a
considerable difference between having the same exegetical starting
points, time and again, with France and simply having convergent
solutions with Spain. A positivist sees the utility and ease of
comparing identical texts. By the mid-nineteenth century the
perception was widespread that Louisiana and French civil law were
so conceptually and textually linked that French authorities acquired
persuasive value in Louisiana. Decisions of the Cour de Cassation as
well as writings of French code commentators came to be accepted
as authorities in Louisiana.77 It led talented Louisiana judges, such
as Provosty and Tate, to cite the modem French commentators in
their opinions. Tellingly, they paid little or no attention to Spanish
commentators. Beginning first with the translation of Planiol in
76. For these reasons I respectfully disagree with recent assertions that the
bulk of the Code of 1825 is "substantively" Spanish. See Mark Fernandez, From
Chaos to Continuity: The Evolution of Louisiana's Legal System, 1712-1862 79
(Louisiana State University Press 2001). Professor Pascal has long endorsed that
position. See R.H. Kilbourne, Foreword, in A History of the Louisiana Civil Code:
The Formative Years, 1803-1839 vii-viii (Paul M. Hebert Law Center Publications
Institutel987). The learned author assumes that the French-for-Spanish
methodology which he perceives Moreau to have followed in drafting the Digest
occurred once again in the drafting of the Code of 1825. That view, however,
ignores the difference of mandate and the differences of method discussed above.
With unfeigned respect for the learned author's views, I believe this aspect of his
argument is without foundation.
77. A computer scan of Louisiana cases from 1809 to present found
approximately 84 cases referring to Cour de Cassation holdings. (Westlaw research
on file with author.) An interesting instance was the first "wrongful death" claim
to arise in Louisiana in Hubgh v. N.0. and Carrollton R.R. Co., 6 La. Ann. 495
(1851). See also Vernon V. Palmer, The Fate of the General Clause in a Cross-
Cultural Setting: The Tort Experience of Louisiana, 46 Loy. L. Rev. 535 (2000).
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1959, the Louisiana Law Institute commissioned the translation of
Aubry et Rau, G~ny, and Baudry-Lacantinerie," and conspicuously
bypassed the Spanish authors. In the 1940s the Louisiana Law
Institute published the "Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of
Louisiana" and it placed next to the Louisiana code articles the
corresponding provisions of the Code Napoleon (1804) and the
French Projet (1800). Significantly, no attempt has ever been made
to enter the Castilian texts into the Compiled Edition. The famous
civil law "renaissance" led by Justices Barham and Tate in the 1970s
and 1980s was really a revival of interest in French civil law, not in
Spanish law.79 Clearly for the past 150 years, then, Louisiana has
had some kind of interactive legal relationship with France and very
little, if any, with Spain. This is not to say that Louisiana's French
connection is today particularly rich or active, for it is actually very
weak. Nevertheless, the man in the street holds a different opinion."
As a matter of tradition and folklore, France is considered the mother
country of Louisiana civil law. The judicial perception that our code
is French-inspired and basically French in content has been rich in
consequences and has produced a reality that overshadows the merits
of the debate over actual sources. To maintain today that Louisiana
law is substantively Spanish, rather than French, runs counter to
general opinion and professional perception.
Of course the promulgation of the Digest did not produce by itself
any immediate shift from Spanish to French law. The word "Digest"
in its title drew attention to a porous design, and the weak tactic of
repealing Spanish law solely on the basis of repugnancy clearly
78. Joseph Dainow, Planiol Citations by Louisiana Courts: 1959-1966, 27 La.
L. Rev. 231 (1967). This article points to rather extensive use of the Planiol treatise
in translation by the Louisiana appellate courts. Between 1959 and 1966, there
were 62 cases and 67 citations to Planiol and sometimes to other French authorities.
Id. at 239. An updated search through the Westlaw database shows 711 Louisiana
cases citing to Planiol in translation, and 217 cases citing to the translation of Aubry
et Rau. (Research on file with author.)
79. Mack Barham, A Renaissance ofthe Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, in The
Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions 38
(Joseph Dainow ed., Louisiana State University 1974).
80. Even Stanley Kowalski had this perception.
Stanley: Have you ever heard of the Napoleonic Code?
Stella: No, Stanley, I haven't heard of the Napoleonic Code and if I
have, I don't see what it -
Stanley: Let me enlighten you on a point or two baby.
Stella: Yes?
Stanley: In the state of Louisiana we have the Napoleonic Code
according to which what belongs to the wife belongs to the
husband and vice versa...




suggested that there must be a brooding derecho com~n beyond the
Digest. It seems fair to say, however, that Moreau Lislet's choice of
model was an advance sign that the days of Spanish influence were
waning. A legislative watershed came later with the enactment of the
Civil Code of 1825. That Code magnified the scope of French
borrowings and sealed off Spanish law much more thoroughly than
the Digest had done. Even then the Louisiana judges were not yet
prepared to shed their perceptions."' The professional class remained
wedded to the idea that Spanish law was the general common law
(derecho common) of Louisiana. Studies of the period from 1809-
1828 show that the lawyers and judges continued to cite and apply
Spanish authorities quite frequently.8 This pro-Spanish attitude
survived the effects of the 1825 codification and even lingered after
the great repealing statute of 1828, but it finally collapsed of its own
weight by mid-century. 3
1.5 Considering the Larger Historical Problem: The Tectonic
Shift
It is a curious aspect of the Batiza/Pascal debate that there has not
been much explanation as to why it matters whether Spanish or
French "sources" prevailed in 1808 or why the issue may still be
important today. Some have wondered whether this is simply an
internal debate among lawyers over the provenance of legal rules or
whether there are larger questions at stake that have been obscured
by the technical discussion." To my mind we have lost sight of an
81. See infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
82. This has been shown by a statistical study of the period. See Raphael
Rabalais, The Influence of Spanish Laws and Treatises on the Jurisprudence of
Louisiana, 42 La. L. Rev. 1485 (1982).
83. Citations to Spanish authorities severely declined after 1850. For example,
according to a computer scan on file with the author, the Spanish author Febrero
was cited 249 times in reported cases between 1809-1850, an average of six cases
per year. But, in the 153 year period, 1850-present, he was cited in merely 22 cases,
which is an average of one case every seven years. The negligible treatment of
Spanish authorities in the great case of State v. Martin, 2 La. Ann. 667 (1847) (in
stark contrast to the overwhelming numbers of French authorities cited in the
opinion) suggests that the turning point had been reached. The full list of these
authorities is set forth in David Combe, An Analysis of the Civil LawAuthorities in
State v. Martin, in Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction 295-320 (V.V.
Palmer ed., Carolina Acad. Press 1999).
84. Warren Billings, for instance, complains that much of Louisiana legal
history written by lawyers, including the Batiza-Pascal debate, tends to be
autonomous "internal legal history" which separates law from its cultural links to
the past. See Warren Billings, Louisiana Legal History and Its Sources: Needs,
Opportunities and Approaches, in Louisiana's Legal Heritage 194-95 (Edward
Haas ed., 1983). For Mark Fernandez the tendency to dwell upon fine points of the
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important historical problem. The debate only obliquely approaches
the question of why this tectonic shift in the private law foundations
took place. There was a return of French law in the first quarter of
the nineteenth century, but why?8 5 Most historians would agree that
Spanish law was officially the common law of Louisiana at the time
of the Louisiana Purchase and that it was never thereafter abrogated
by name.86 Most historians also recognize that French law was
law has caused the "homegrown" historians to interpret Louisiana as "a unique,
almost mystical jurisdiction whose study is open only to civil law experts." From
Chaos to Continuity, supra note 74, at xiv. Billings' and Fernandez' plea for
cultural linkage is correct and to be welcomed. Nevertheless, it is not easily
executed. For example, the school of "New Louisiana Legal History" tends to
derive its view of Louisiana's basic similarity to other American jurisdictions
mainly from the study of Louisiana's judicial institutions. This is an important area
of study, but it places the entire stress upon Louisiana's most American feature and
of course the characteristic institution of common law process. Such study may
provide links to legal culture rather than general culture, and in Louisiana's case,
the link is to only one part of legal culture. This, in my view, does not necessarily
liberate us from autonomous internal legal history. It could lead us to discount the
role of the particular cultural forces and linguistic demands which produced the
only Romanist codes enacted in the United States.
85. In his contribution to this symposium, Professor Randy Trahan of the Paul
M. Hebert Law Center at Louisiana State University writes that by the late 1820s
the use of Spanish authorities greatly slowed and use of French authorities
increased. He explores various reasons for this "French turn." See J.-R. Trahan,
The Continuing Influence ofle Droit Civil and el Derecho Civil in the Private Law
of Louisiana, 63 La. L. Rev. 1019 (2004).
86. This statement does not overlook the opposed view, notably that taken by
President Thomas Jefferson, Colonel John Tucker, and Gustavus Schmidt, that
French law was never actually replaced by Spanish law and thus was still in effect
at the time of the retrocession. This theory is discussed in Yiannopoulos, supra
note 55, at 87-96. However, the partisans of the "French theory" have been refuted.
Professor Baade has shown that O'Reilly was authorized to introduce the Spanish
system subject to subsequent approval. He did, in fact, introduce Spanish-Castilian
law and received subsequent approval by royal Cddula dated August 17, 1772.
Hans Baade, The Formalities of Private Real Estate Transactions in Spanish North
America, 38 La. L. Rev. 656, 682 (1978). See also the important essays of
Elizabeth Brown, Law and Government in the "Louisiana Purchase ": 1803-1804,
2 Wayne L. Rev. 169-89 (1956) and Rodolfo Batiza, The Unity of Private Law in
Louisiana under the Spanish Rule, 4 Inter-American L. Rev. 139-56 (1962).
Furthermore, the "French theory" cannot square with the evidence in Louisiana's
archival records showing the actual application of Spanish law for more than thirty
years and the statements of so many contemporaries in the American period,
including those of the judges of the Supreme Court, that Spanish law came abruptly
into effect after 1769 and remained in effect in 1803 and thereafter. If the French
theory were correct, all contemporaries were massively mistaken, including the
Supreme Court in deciding the case of Cottin v. Cottin, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 138 (La.
1817) and, likewise, the Legislature of 1819, which believing that Spanish law was
still in vigor, commissioned the translation of Las Siete Partidas into English.
Finally, Moreau Lislet himself would have been mistaken, since he stated in the
preface to the translation that Spanish law came into effect by virtue of O'Reilly's
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abrogated in 1769 and was never formally reintroduced by name.
Absent other facts therefore, one might conclude that Spanish law
remains the basis of the Louisiana private law system. And yet, an
objective observer will find that French private law was reinstated as
the droit commun of Louisiana. The judiciary resisted this change,
but, as already mentioned, by the 1850s the resistance was finally
over. This is only the bare outline of what occurred, however, and
still does not furnish an explanation for it.
The debate over the Digest, because it has been waged in
positivistic terms, i.e., by analyzing sources and the intentions of
drafters, has not produced any wider rationales for this development.
The positive enactments alone reveal little about the mind of the
legislature or the society. There is not even a projet or exposg des
motifs for the Digest, nor any record of the debates in the Territorial
Legislature. In the case of the Civil Code of 1825, the Report to the
Legislature of 1823 and the exposg des motifs accompanying the
Projet are the best indication we have of the thoughts of the
jurisconsults, but that is somewhat insufficient for these purposes.
Searching for answers under these circumstances two centuries later
is somewhat hazardous. It is usual, in attempting to explain the
abundance of French "sources" in the Digest, to stress the
convenience and practicality of accepting the French models as
surrogates for Spanish law. Those arguments provide important
explanations and are explored in the next section. Nevertheless, to my
mind there is a missing element that makes the case more persuasive.
In an excursus immediately following, I will argue that socio-cultural
forces played an important role and that the Digest represents,
consciously or unconsciously, the first of several steps taken by a
French-oriented society to restore its own legal tradition.
1.6 Practicalities and Legal Realities in Context
A few points should be made about the political context in which
the Digest was written. First, at that particular time Louisiana, Creole
forces were more united in their opposition to the English common
law than in raising questions about the specific kind of civil law they
sought to retain. The Digest satisfied their political and cultural
demands first and foremost because it enacted civil law rather than
common law. Whether it embodied too much French or too little
1769 proclamation and from that time "French law ceased to have any authority in
this country." Moreau Lislet & Carleton, The Laws of Las Siete Partidas,
Translators' Preface xix-xxi (Madrid reprint, 1996) (1820).
87. Rodolfo Batiza, The Influence ofSpanish Law in Louisiana, 23 Tul. L. Rev.
29 (1958). "The law of France, in its own name, never reappeared in Louisiana."
Id. at31.
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Spanish civil law, it can be argued, was of secondary importance. 8
As a political matter, keeping the common law out of Louisiana was
the first concern, a point which would tend to explain why historians
have uncovered no contemporary criticism about the heavy French
borrowings in Moreau-Lislet's work. 9 While this permitted a unified
front, the specific French character of the borrowings is not by any
means accidental but has its own socio-political rationale. °
Moreover, there were strong pressures upon Moreau Lislet to adopt
a prit i porter solution to the task at hand. He had neither enough
time nor the requisite expertise (Moreau-Lislet, born in St.
Domingue, studied law in Paris and his knowledge of Spanish law
must have come from two years of legal practice in New Orleans) 9'
necessary to draft an original code out of the Spanish law of that
period. Spain itself was unable to codify its law until the late
88. My view as to the secondary nature of that question is influenced by two
of the most important documents of the era: the "Manifesto" by the General
Assembly in 1806 and the Constitution of 1812. In the Manifesto, see further note
120, the Creoles did not mention the national basis of the civil law they wished to
retain. They simply argued that they wished to retain the law which they had
known since childhood ("He has sucked this knowledge at his mother's breast, he
has received it by the tradition of his forefathers and he has perfected it by the
experience of a long and laborious life," 9 Terr. Papers 642, and which was written
in the language spoken by the population. The main thrust of the argument was to
keep out the common law and retain the civil law, perhaps giving the impression
that either Spanish or French civil law would do. Of course, the argument actually
pointed in the direction of retaining French civil law without really saying so, since
Spanish law was not written in the language spoken by the population nor
inculcated since childhood. But, the Manifesto proceeded by indirection and
carefully avoided naming the law it had in mind. In the Constitution of 1812,
Creole forces placed a famous restriction on the power of the Louisiana legislature
to adopt a legal system by general reference, a provision certainly directed against
the common law system, since it was unwritten and uncodified and could only be
adopted by means of general reference. The provision also operated as a safeguard
to preserve the existing civil law. It did not differentiate between Spanish and
French varieties though, here again, only French law at that time was ripe for
adoption by specific legislation. See also Cairns, supra note 13, at 80; Tucker,
supra note 20, at 104. Tucker writes, "The ancient Louisianians ... did not codify
[in 1808] so they could do away with the old laws. They codified so they could
keep them." Id. at 105.
89. There is abundant evidence that this copying of French law was public
knowledge at the time. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text. Further,
Cairns argues that those surprised by the amount of copying from French law are
simply mistaken. Many countries adopted versions of the French Code far closer
to the original. The redactors of the Digest were in effect following the civilian
tradition, though not to a slavish extent. Cairns, supra note 13, at 81.
90. See infra section 1.7.
91. His proficiency in Spanish was acquired in the course of a year he spent in
Cuba before coming to New Orleans. During the first six months after his arrival




nineteenth century (1889), so it is difficult to see how this was
feasible in Louisiana eight decades earlier.92 Even assuming such a
task lay within his powers, it would have taken many years, perhaps
five, ten, or more, to reduce the intractable Spanish law into codified
form, and political events could not be put on hold. Given the influx
of Americans into Louisiana, Creole political control of the
legislature was already disappearing rather quickly. 93 The condition
of Spanish law, however, provided one of the strongest reasons to
prefer French law on its merits. Louisiana had a pressing need for
clear and simplified laws expressed in the French and English
languages. Spanish law was, by any standard, an inaccessible and
disorganized mass of material, which was once succinctly described
as "eleven codes, in twenty-three volumes, containing 20,335 laws"
all in a foreign language, 94 "of which a complete collection has never
been seen in the state . . . .9 French civil law afforded an
opportunity to adopt a crucially new kind of law. As Shael Herman
notes, it was a turning point in human thinking about law.96 The
spirit of the Code Frangais confided a supreme faith in rationalism
into the hands of a god-like legislator. This bourgeois Code
embodied a secular morality consecrated to human autonomy, a new
system of ownership, greater economic and commercial freedoms,
and greater liberty of marriage and divorce. It was stripped of many
feudal, theocratic, and monarchical features found in Spanish law. It
92. Ironically, Spain relied greatly upon the French Civil Code as a model for
its civil code of 1889, and followed the Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 as well. See
Jos6 Maria Castfn Vasquez, Reciprocal Influences Between the Laws of Spain and
Louisiana, 42 La. L. Rev. 1473 (1982); Shael Herman; Louisiana's Contribution
to the 1852 Projet of the Spanish Civil Code, 42 La. L. Rev. 1509 (1982).
93. The demographic change in Louisiana was so swift that the founding of the
civil law system has been described as a 'race against time.'
Had the French population of Louisiana not been ascendant and
somewhat chauvinistic in the period 1803-1812, it seems to me that
Louisiana might have opted for a complete somersault to the common
law. Had the founding been delayed perhaps twenty years, Louisiana
might have gone the way of Texas and of other jurisdictions that might
have been mixed, but never were.
Vernon Palmer, Two Worlds in One: The Genesis of Louisiana's Mixed Legal
System, 1803-1812, in Louisiana Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction 23, 39
(Vernon V. Palmer ed., Carolina Acad. Press 1999).
94. William H. Byrnes, Jr., John Tucker, Jr. & Gaston Porterie, Foreword, 1
La. Legal Archives, v, vi (1937). "This multiplicity of laws was further
complicated by the conflict of their provisions, and from the uncertainty of the
authority of opposing enactments, in cases of conflict." Id. at vi.
95. Edward Livingston, Moreau Lislet, & P. Derbigny, Preliminary Report of
the Code Commissioners dated February 13, 1823, 1 La. Legal Archives, LXXXV
(1937).
96. Shael Herman, From Philosophers to Legislators, and Legislators to Gods:
The French Civil Code as Secular Scripture, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 597.
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was among the first to delete all references to the King from its
provisions and to presuppose that the King's former powers now
resided in the legislature, courts, and the executive.97 It divorced
Church teaching from its provisions and unlike the Partidas, did not
define duties in terms of "sins" nor rely upon the separate courts of the
"holy church."' This was, for Louisiana, a chance to fill the entire
private law sector with the most advanced legal science of its day.
All of these reasons were no doubt rational pragmatic grounds for
adopting the French models, but I wish to argue that there is something
more important behind the scenes. There were, I believe, strong
cultural, historical, and instinctive forces within Louisiana society itself
which pulled the redactors and the legislature toward this end.
Comparative law teaches us that this is not at all strange or unusual.
Legal chauvinism and cultural identification have been the "invisible
foundation" on which the original inhabitants in mixed jurisdictions
have usually made their claim to keep 'their' civil law.99
97. I wish to thank Thomas Tucker for the insight that the French codes were
designed for a republican form of government and therefore did not mention the King
or the Crown. The point is also made in Tucker's essay The King is Lost Upon the
Batture. Thomas Tucker, The King is Lost Upon the Batture, in Louisiana:
Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction 134-36, n. 11-12 (Vernon V. Palmer ed., Carolina
Acad. Press 1999). For an account of the historical circumstances surrounding the
enactment of the Digest, see Vernon V. Palmer, Two Worlds in One: The Genesis of
Louisiana's Mixed Legal System, 1803-1812, in Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed
Jurisdiction 23-39 (Vernon V. Palmer ed., Carolina Acad. Press 1999). See also
Vernon V. Palmer & Mathew Sheynes, Louisiana, in Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide:
The Third Legal Family 257-69 (Vernon V. Palmer ed., Cambridge 2001).
98. Sin and church are inextricably interwoven into the fabric of the Partidas.
Adultery as a marital offense, for example, is dealt with as follows:
No other person but the spouses themselves, can make an accusation for
such a cause [adultery]; and it ought to be made before the bishop or the
ecclesiastic judge official either by the parties themselves, or their
attomies. And every man who know that his wife commits adultery is
bound to accuse her of it, ifhe thinks she will not renounce, but persevere
in that sin, and if he does not accuse her, he will himself, sin mortally.
But if he thinks she will desist from that sin, and do penance for it, then
if he does not wish to accuse her, he will not commit a sin .... And if
peradventure the husband should not choose to accuse her; and she
should not wish to desist from her wicked practices: then the accusation
may be brought against her, by her nearest relations: and if these do not
wish to do itthen by any other person whatever. For the holy church
think proper, to permit every person to accuse a woman who commits
such a sin. For, as all persons are prohibited from committing the sin of
adultery; so he who commits it, sins against the right which belongs to
all.
The Laws of Las Sietes Partidas, Law 2, Part. IV, Title Ix, 487 (Moreau Lislet &
Henry Carleton trans., Claitor's Publishing 1978).
99. See Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide, supra note 97, 18-19.
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1.7 Excursus: A Socio-Political Explanation for the Return of
French Law
Let me frankly admit that the argument and the historical account
which follows is indeed speculative. Speculation is not terribly new,
nor particularly unusual in studies of this kind. Given the minimum
amount of historical records, many historical claims about the Digest
have also been speculative. Neither I nor another historian can prove,
at this remove, what historical actors 200 years ago chose to obscure,
or even that they chose to obscure anything. My thesis, however, is
persuasive, because it is consistent with the historical facts we have
and also it is consistent with our knowledge of what has occurred
under similar circumstances in other mixed jurisdictions.
The legal history of Louisiana is sometimes treated as if it were
just a saga of shifting sovereigns, the story of a succession of flags
which once waved over the capital. The succession of states, however,
does not always determine the succession of laws, any more than a
shift in sovereignty suddenly determines the language people will
speak, the customs they observe, the crops they will plant, or the
family recipe for gumbo. Much is deeply located in social conditioning
and lies beyond the power of the Crown or the nation state to change
within a short period of time. For similar reasons it appears to be
historical to assume that French law suddenly disappeared during the
Spanish "domination" just because it was indeed abrogated by
O'Reilly's proclamation in 1769. Instead, we find that an attachment
for French laws and customs persisted and French law was to some
extent in force at an unofficial level during Spanish rule and thereafter.
It must not be forgotten that Spanish law in Luisiana was imposed
law and as such was neither popular nor deeply rooted in the lay
consciousness. From the first, rather than accept Spanish rule, the
colonists expelled the first Spanish governor, Don Antonio de Ulloa,
and took control of the government, claiming they had a legal right
to maintain their French institutions and traditions. Quite a few
different reasons for the rebellion may have existed (Ulloa's political
ineptitude, the severe trade restrictions he imposed, an insufficient
military force at his disposal, and so forth),"° but the public
justifications offered by the leaders of the revolt of 1768 were heavily
based in principles of legality and played to the desire of the
Louisiana French to keep their ancient laws and institutions. Indeed,
applying their own laws and customs as the test, they claimed that the
100. These are canvassed in David Texada, Alejandro O'Reilly and the New
Orleans Rebels 19-21 (University of Southwestern Louisiana 1970). For further
views, see Vicente Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros Anos de Dominaci6n Espaftola en
Luisiana (1942); John Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, The Spanish Occupation
1766-1770 (Louisiana State University Press 1976).
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Treaty of Cession to Spain had no validity, as to them at least, since
it had not been registered with the Superior Council. Furthermore,
Governor Ulloa had usurped lawful power because his credentials
and authorization had not been presented and registered with that
body.' ' Interestingly, the rebellion enjoyed enthusiastic popular
support and was led by some of the highest placed colonial officials.
One of these was the King's Attorney General who was a member of
the Superior Council (le Conseil Supgrieur), the lawmaking and
judicial body which had powers the equivalent to a Parlement of
France and which formed the heart of France's colonial
government. 0 2
One is not sure whether the Spanish Crown, had its pride not been
wounded by the revolt, might have been content to rule Louisiana
through its public and political laws alone and to leave French private
law in place,0 3 but the ignominious deportation of Ulloa aboard a
101. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. However impractical the
argument may have been, this reliance upon French law as the test of the Spanish
Crown's own actions was not illogical in view of the fact that French law, to that
point, had been left in force. See Baade, supra note 3, at 32-37.
102. Thus Lafrniire, the chief leader of the revolt who was the King's Attorney
General, justified the rebellion in the form of a remonstrance of Parlement, by
claiming that the treaty of cession to Spain had been violated by Governor Ulloa.
He argued that the treaty secured for the inhabitants of the colony "the preservation
of ancient and known privileges ... under the protection and shelter of their canon
and civil laws," and paramount among these laws was the necessity to register all
laws and ordinances and the treaty of cession itself with the Superior Council,
which Ulloa was obliged to do if he was to exercise lawful power, but which,
among other sins, he had failed to do. For a detailed account, see Charles Gayarr6,
History of Louisiana, The French Domination, vol II, 193-202 (Gresham 1879).
In a contemporaneous plea addressed to King Louis XV, the Superior Council
described the degree to which French law was inseparable from their social identity:
Men are born under laws which become gradually familiar and dear to
them, in proportion as from childhood they grow into manhood, when
their attachment to them can no longer be destroyed. Men who have
reached the meridian of life cannot, of their own free will, remold their
character, their heart, their honest and time-honored habits. It can only
be accomplished by force. What a modification of their existence does
it require!
Id. at 223-24.
103. In the treaty of cession, Louis XV had requested the Spanish sovereign to
retain French law as a favor to his former subjects, though this request was not
made a formal reserve of the treaty, as Lafrni~re attempted to make it into.
Charles III of Spain was initially willing to accede to the request. His instructions
to Governor Ulloa were clear:
I have resolved that, in [Louisiana], there be no change in the
administration of its government, and therefore, that it be not subjected
to the laws and usages which are observed in my American dominions,
from which it is a distinct colony, and with which it is to have no
commerce. It is my will that it be independent of the ministry of the
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frigate apparently moved Madrid to assert its full authority. It sent a
heavily-armed force from Cuba, headed by Governor Alejandro
O'Reilly, who, as is well known, took control over the colony in 1769,
executed the leaders of the coup, replaced the Superior Council with
a Cabildo, and introduced both public and private Spanish law. The
Governor issued an abridged version of the Spanish laws, thereafter
known as "O'Reilly's Code," to be followed in all civil and criminal
affairs, which was to serve as a guide "until a more general knowledge
of the Spanish language be introduced in this province.""0 The
apparent abrupt changeover to foreign laws of which the inhabitants
were completely ignorant was regarded as a severe blow to the
colony.105
Yet over the course of the next thirty years, Spanish private law
never fully monopolized the field and in some ways only shared the
field with French law. The extent of Spain's civil and military
presence was limited to the capital and selected outlying posts, which
meant that the degree to which this law came to be assimilated and
used by the general population was far from complete. The colonists
continued to regard their old law in the same way they regarded their
language, religion, and collective cultural experience. Indeed, as is
usual for peoples who have undergone shifting sovereigns and
uncertain futures, we may assume that they pinned their hopes upon
their native legal system to serve as a means to preserve their culture
in all its manifestations. 0
6
"Lower Louisiana" had been overwhelmingly French in language,
moeurs, manners, and legal expectations and remained that way
throughout Spanish rule. In Lewis Newton's words, Louisiana was
a receptacle for a polyglot European immigration in which the
prevailing stamp of life and culture was French. Diverse strains of
Indies, of its council, and of the other tribunals annexed to it; ....
Gayarr6, supra note 102, at 158.
104. These laws are reprinted in Gustavus Schmidt, Ordinances andInstructions
of Don Alexander O'Reilly, I La. L.J. 1-60 (1841) and are also excerpted in
Gayarr6, supra note 102, at 8-19.
105. F.-X. Martin, whose history of Louisiana covered all periods down to 1815,
said of this decision:
It is oppressive, in the highest degree, to require that a community
should instantaneously submit to a total change in the laws that hitherto
governed it, and be compelled to regulate its conduct by rules of which
it is totally ignorant. Such was, however, the lot of the people of
Louisiana.
F.-X. Martin, History of Louisiana: From the Earliest Period (3d ed., Pelican
Publishing 1975); Gayarr6, History of Louisiana 209 (5th ed., Pelican Publishing
1975).
106. Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal Family 18 (Vernon V.
Palmer ed., Cambridge 2001).
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the "free" population-German, Canadian, Spanish-entered this
melting pot and learned the French language, intermarried with
French families, and often changed their surnames in order to appear
to be of French descent.0 7 This process of assimilation did not abate
during Spanish rule; even the Spanish Governors and their Iberian
settlers adapted to their French surroundings. In more than thirty
years, Spain was never able to people Louisiana with a sufficient
number to alter greatly the French character of the province.'0 8 "The
Spanish in Louisiana," writes Christina Vella, "right up to Governors
Galvez and Mir6 married the daughters of Creole planters, served
Bordeaux at their official dinners, danced the galopade, sedulously
gambled their money at bourri, and reared children who could not
speak a word of Spanish. Almonester and Mir6 ... spoke only
French at home like many other Spaniards in Louisiana."'' 09 James
Pitot observed in 1802, "the population of Louisiana, Spanish by its
government, is still generally French in its tastes, customs, habits,
religion and language."' 10
A strong attachment for French laws and customs continued to be
felt, particularly outside of New Orleans where Spanish authority was
weak. Professor Hans Baade's detailed research of marriage contracts
in the Spanish period shows that formal Castilian law did not govern
these contracts except in New Orleans. "Living" Paris notarial
contract prototypes were used in the rest of the province. He
describes Louisiana's condition as amounting to a "dual state. ''l
This suggests that the French population beyond the capital clung to
their original law under the Spanish, relying upon French customary
ways to regulate wealth transmission through marriage agreements.
Equally revealing is Professor Baade's discovery that soon after the
Louisiana Purchase, even those marriage contracts registered in New
Orleans stopped following Castilian law and reverted to the Paris
notarial forms, though Castilian law was still in force. This
spontaneous reversion to French customary marriage contracts in the
capital indicates the ingrained nature of these practices. Moreover,
research respecting French legal institutions such as the "family
council" indicates that the outlying French population continued to
call together family meetings on important legal matters, even though
the family council was expressly abolished by Governor Unzaga in
107. Lewis Newton, Americanization ofFrench Louisiana 1803-1860 17(1980).
108. Id. at 13.
109. Christina Vella, Intimate Enemies (Louisiana State UniversityPress 1997).
110. James Pitot, Observations on the Colony of Louisiana from 1796-1802 31
(Louisiana State University Press 1979).
111. Baade, supra note 3, at 73-79, discussed in Cairns, supra note 13.
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1771 and was not recognized in Spanish law." 2 This evidence too
suggests a dual state. "L'assemblke de la famille" was not
recognized in New Orleans 1 3 but was functioning in the hinterlands.
Further, as we have seen, Moreau Lislet brought the family council
officially back to life in his Digest, though he was surely aware that
Spanish law was still in force and knew no such institution. 1 4 Here
again we see an example of spontaneous reversion to a French
custom.
This survival at the level of folkway or "living law" is evidence
of deep internalization, but it may also indicate that Spanish law
remained relatively unpopular and disliked or was only superficially
understood by the general population."5 One reason perhaps why
French civil law could be so easily revived after Spanish rule was that
it had never been forgotten or relinquished in the Creole mind.
As already mentioned, Spanish law had its greatest effect on the
citizens and officials of the capital and in the courts and institutions
of government located there. It directly affected the small group of
legal professionals who were allowed to practice law in the territory
after 1803. It was their livelihood to know this law well, and for
professional reasons they were strongly attached to it. French and
Spanish policy had previously kept all private lawyers out of the
province, and thus, ironically, there was no professional class
championing Spanish law until after the departure of the Spanish."6
This brings us back once again to Moreau Lislet who, as already
mentioned, was a Paris-trained lawyer born on the isle of St.
Domingue where he practiced law and held various governmental
112. On the survival of the family council, see Kurt Verheggen, Tutorship and
Emancipation: A Comparative Study Between French and Spanish Colonial Law
in Louisiana (1994) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
113. See the case initiated by Juan Esteban Bor6 in 1784,24 La. Hist. Quarterly
(1941), whose contention was upheld in court that husbands can appoint their wives
as tutrices to their children in their will, without calling a family meeting.
114. See infra section 1.4.1.
115. When the British attempted to impose the common law upon the French
Quebec population in the years 1767-1775, they faced strong cultural resistance and
boycotts of the legal system. The events and comparisons with the Louisiana
experience are described in Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide: The Third Legal
Family 23 (Vernon V. Palmer, ed., Cambridge 2001).
116. Lewis Newton writes that at the time of the Purchase, there were not more
than three or four lawyers in the entire territory. By 1810 the number of lawyers
in New Orleans had risen to about twenty and judging by their surnames they were
almost evenly divided between Anglo-Americans and Creoles. The profession was
split into two branches, the avocats and the procureurs, and the latter enjoyed a
wider right of audience that included the higher courts. It appears that Moreau
Lislet was among this last group. See Newton, supra note 107, at 175; and Gayarr6,
The New Orleans Bench and Bar in 1823, in McCaleb, The Louisiana Book, 54,68
(1894).
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appointments." 7 In the Pascal/Batiza debate it has been suggested
that he stretched his instructions, but this is hardly surprising in light
of the dominant feelings of the society and his own legal/cultural
identity. He emigrated to New Orleans in 1805 with far greater
experience and credentials in French than Spanish law. We do not
know the story of his appointment by the legislature nor do we have
documentary evidence about actual expectations of his appointers.
It is important, however, to note that those in control of the
legislature were themselves, in cultural orientation and political
leanings, decidedly French.
The Territorial Legislature of 1806 was the first democratically-
elected institution known to Louisiana and it was dominated by the
ancient Louisianians."' According to Governor'Claiborne's census
in 1806, the Americans then formed merely 13% of the white
population. The bicameral General Assembly consisted of a House
of Representatives of 25 directly-elected members. The upper house,
called the Legislative Council, consisted of five members to be
selected by the President of the United States from a list of 10 names
chosen by the House of Representatives. Since the elections of 1805
returned a strong majority of Creoles to the House, the ten names
which that body submitted to the President were 80% Creole. 9
Thus, President Jefferson had little choice but to allow Creole
elements to predominate in the upper as well as well as the lower
houses. Local control set Louisiana apart from some other French or
Dutch or Spanish colonies which were destined to become mixed
jurisdictions. Louisianians retained private civil law not as a matter
of the ruler's grace but because they controlled the legislature and
had the political initiative. It is true that the Governor possessed a
veto power, but, as events demonstrated, that weapon was relatively
weak and needed to be used sparingly. 21
117. Between 1790 and 1803, he held at various time the posts of public
prosecutor, public defender, and interim judge, while apparently practicing law as
well. See Levasseur, supra note 31, at 95-113.
118. By Act of Congress, March 2, 1805, a democratic General Assembly
replaced the old Legislative Council which was a short-lived unicameral institution
whose 13 members were appointed directly by the President. Jefferson's policy
was to ensure a majority of American representatives on the old Legislative
Council ("In the legislative council I think it necessary to place a majority of
Americans, say 7 Americans and 6 French... .") Letter to Claiborne, August 30,
1804, but this policy apparently backfired. Leading Creoles boycotted the
institution and refused to serve in the minority.
119. Under these constraints he chose Joseph Bellechasse, Noel Destr~han,
Augustin Macarty ( a direct descendant of Mir6 and later Mayor of New Orleans),
Pierre Sauv6, and Evan Jones.
120. The French members of the Legislature used their preponderant numbers
as a means of neutralizing the Governor's veto. They had no difficulty passing an
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Although this is speculation, it would seem unlikely that a
Legislature would seriously expect Moreau Lislet to produce a code
based on Spanish civil law, particularly when his expertise in that
respect was not strong. Would not a Creole-dominated legislature be
culturally predisposed to welcome a code based in the French legal
tradition? James Brown, one of the redactors of the Digest of
Orleans and a highly connected political observer, made this very
point. In 1805 he opined that the members of the legislature were
"generally" attached to French laws and he predicted the kind of code
they would produce. He stated, "The members of the Council and
House of Representatives will generally be attached to French Laws
and will pass only acts resembling the Civil Laws and the Spanish
Ordinances formerly in force here.".. Brown's prediction rested
solely upon an understanding of the cultural biases of the members.
But it may be asked, how much did the Legislature or the public
know about the redactors' work and their borrowings? It would be
an error to assume that Moreau's heavy French borrowings were kept
secret from the Legislature or from the public. An oversight
committee composed of four members of the House and two of the
Legislative Council was charged with responsibility "to meet,
whenever requested so to do by the jurisconsults, in order to examine
and discuss such parts of the new code as may be completed.'1 2 The
Digest required the approval of that committee and the General
Assembly, and one may reasonably assume that the borrowings were
fully known about and discussed before receiving general approval.
Act in 1806 "declaring the laws which continue to be in force in the Territory of
Orleans." When the measure was vetoed by Governor Claiborne, however, they
immediately turned to protest. The upper house unanimously passed a Resolution
to dissolve the General Assembly dated May 28, 1806, on grounds that Claiborne
intended "to reign alone" and the institution had become "expensive and useless."
The body of the motion sets forth a "Manifesto" on the Creole view of the civil
law. The motion to dissolve ultimately failed in the House of Representatives by
a single vote, but all of the signatories in the House-Bor6, Bouligny, Arnauld,
Andry, Bernard, Sorrel, Prudhome [sic], Hebert, Delorme, and Landry-had French
surnames. See 9 Terr. Papers 642-57. When the Legislature immediately
commissioned Moreau Lislet and Brown to draft a civil code, and when Claiborne
did not veto that act, his veto was effectively lost on that issue. The code or digest
would take several years to complete and entailed substantial payments to the
redactors. In my view Claiborne would have been in no position in 1808 to block
passage of the Digest unless he had done so before the redaction had started. He
had effectively estopped himself from exercising it later.
121. Elizabeth Brown, Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1804-1812,
1 Am. J. Legal Hist. 35, 40-41 (1957); also quoted in Cairns, supra note 13, at 83.
122. Resolution of June 7, 1806. The committee was directed to report any
disagreements between it and the jurisconsults at the time the legislature took up the
discussion of the code. Id. Le Moniteur of Jan. 27, 1808 reported that the
members of the code oversight committee from the House of Representatives were
Villars, Hughes, Kerr, and LaCroix.
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It is, however, principally the statements made by individuals outside
of the legislature which prove that the borrowings were not kept
secret from the public. Three eminent jurists, Edward Livingston,
Justice Martin, and Justice Bullard, were well aware of the French
indebtedness and spoke of it as if it were a matter of public
knowledge.123 In a pamphlet written in New Orleans in 1806,
Jeremiah Brown emphasized that it was thoroughly known to the
public: "It is a matter of public notoriety that our St. Domingo
Lycurgus is avowedly copying his new code from that of Bonaparte,
to the infinite delight of the whole party by whom he is employed."""
If, as Brown asserts, Moreau was "avowedly" copying his new code,
it is probably the redactor himself or members of the code committee
who were professing the fact. If the copying caused "the infinite
delight of the party by whom he is employed," Moreau's legislative
backers must have been aware and satisfied. Under these
circumstances do we not have all the ingredients for a conscious
reception of French law? Certainly Moreau's conduct qua codifier
received no reproach; indeed his standing with the legislature
continued to rise. When the House of Representatives later selected
three Jurisconsults to draft the second Louisiana civil code, he
received nearly twice the number of votes received by Edward
Livingston and Pierre Derbigny.1 2
5
1.8 Was There Lasting Impact?
The Pascal/Batiza debate may never be resolved, but the
problems with which the protagonists struggle are quite important.
Indeed, as I have tried to indicate, the question involves more than
verifying the true sources of the Digest. That is only part of a
fascinating and important story of social and legal change. It is a
valuable example of the tenacious connection between a dominant
culture and its laws, of the limits of sovereignty over deeply
internalized practices, and of the reassertion and reimplanting of an
original native law when the political opportunity arose. The process
123. Thus, Edward Livingston wrote Jefferson, "You are aware, Sir, that in the
year 1808 a civil Code was adopted in that State, founded chiefly on that of
Napoleon. .. ." Letter March 9, 1825, quoted in Levasseur, supra note 31, at 222.
Justice Martin, a contemporary, recorded a similar point in his History of
Louisiana. Martin, supra note 105. Justice Henry Bullard said of the Digest, "This
compilation was little more than a mutilated copy of the Code Napoleon." Henry
A. Bullard, A. Discourse on the Life and Character of the Hon. Francois Xavier
Martin: Late Senior Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana,
Pronounced at the Request of the Bar of New Orleans I 1 (J.B. Steele 1847).
124. See supra note 1.




of change cannot be really appreciated by studying the Digest in
isolation from later periods, for the clearest part of the reimplantation
took place with the redaction of the Civil Code of 1825 and the legal
evolution thereafter. It is clear that the adoption of France's codistic
model in 1808 had long term impact on the future direction and
underlying nature of Louisiana's mixed legal system. Had a Spanish-
based civil code been literally executed by Moreau Lislet, then
Louisiana's legal history and its own sense of self would have been
vastly different. A second wave of codification might never have
been necessary, at least not for the same reasons; and any second
code, if and when it came, would have probably deepened the Spanish
ties of the first code. To be sure, Louisiana would have still developed
into a mixed jurisdiction, but probably one situated in the Spanish
tradition along the lines of Puerto Rico and The Philippines.' But
this was not to be.
2.0 The Quiescent Years of the Legislature: 1825-1975
We have seen the great quantity of French law which Louisiana
ingested in the period 1808-1825. Over the next 150 years, the
contribution remained basically undisturbed. The legislature enacted
very few amendments to the Civil Code. Professor Jolowicz, while
visiting Louisiana in the 1950s observed that it was much easier to
pass a series of constitutional amendments in Louisiana than a single
amendment to the Civil Code. There was a technical revision of the
Civil Code which took place in 1870, but this came after the Civil War
and was designed only to expurgate provisions dealing with slavery
which of course by then were unconstitutional. Outside of this
deletion and a few small amendments, the 1870 revision was basically
a verbatim re-enactment of the Code of 1825. Accordingly the
foundations of the law were hardly affected. Indeed the feelings of
continuity were so strong that the French version of the Code of 1825
continued to be used to correct the errors of translation carried
forward by the republished English text of 1870.
In 1913, a more substantial revision was begun and a committee
of lawyers prepared aprojet, but it failed to gain the approval of the
bar or the legislature. 2 7 In the 1930s and 1940s it was increasingly
126. However since Louisiana was not Spanish speaking and had little Spanish
legal culture, a Spanish private civil law would probably have been more easily
and rapidly Americanized, if the experience in the Philippines, where similar social
conditions existed, is any guide. See Palmer, Mixed Jurisdictions Worldwide,
supra note 99, at 28-29.
127. For details, see A.N. Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years in the Life of the
Louisiana Civil Code: 1870 and 1913, 53 La. L. Rev. 5 (1992).
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noted that the Civil Code was old and anachronistic and that the need
for comprehensive revision was pressing and long overdue.128 In 1948
the Legislature entrusted the task to the Louisiana State Law Institute,
but the first preparatory work was not completed until 1968. At that
time the Revision of the Code began in earnest.
It remains to be seen to what extent this Revision has altered the
historic relationship with the Code Napoleon and other French
sources. The type of codification Louisiana created has also to be
characterized.
3. 0 The Revision: 1975-2003 and Counting Its Apologists and Its
Critics
The so-called "Piecemeal Revision" has been criticized as being
something less than an orderly, scientific undertaking. The revision
has, however, its pragmatic defenders. It is argued that because the
Legislature has not properly funded the undertaking, the Institute is
prosecuting the Revision in the only manner feasible under the
circumstances.
Many criticisms, however, are not necessarily related to
resources. Critics contend that the Louisiana Law Institute began the
work without developing a vision of what it wanted in a new code
and with no policy planning in advance. No outline of the proposed
code was ever drafted. The basic structure of the Code was never
questioned. More seriously, no discussion of the necessity of
expressly repealing the prior code ever took place. Thus a haphazard
and inconsistent approach characterized the process. In consequence,
there is both a new code and an old code which is unrepealed.
Equally significant was the failure to discuss the future of judicial
precedents under the old code and to define their relationship with the
new code. Without guidance or advance planning, the drafters freely
used the jurisprudence as a judicial acquis and attached the cases by
name and citation to the new code articles. 2 9  Furthermore, the
Institute and its appointed Reporters proceeded to revise the code in
no particular sequence or order, with many scholars of varying
ability, credentials and experience working in independent groups on
128. See Morrison, supra note 19; C.J. Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian
Codification and Legal Methodfor State and Nation, 17 Tul. L. Rev. 351(1943).
129. In the 1968 discussions on the codification of the English and Scottish law
of contract, the problem of "the role of precedent in a system moving towards
codification and especially, the authority respectively of pre-code and of post-code
decisions" proved thorny and was not resolved. See A.E. Anton, Obstacles to
Codification, 27 Jurid. Rev. 15, 20 (1982). It was one of the obstacles causing the
abandonment of the codification project. Louisiana's nonchalant planning caused
it to ignore the problem that the Scots clearly foresaw.
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its various books and titles. 130 A fundamental criticism relates to the
piecemeal strategy. The Institute chose not to hold back the revised
"pieces" until they could be compared, unified, and submitted as a
whole to the Legislature, but decided to have them enacted one by
one in the order of their completion. The criticism is not so much
leveled at the use of multiple drafting teams under committee
oversight, nor at the considerable duration of the process (after all,
slow collaborative methods were successfully used in drafting the
BGB and more recently the NBW). Rather it is directed at the
"rolling enactment" of disparate material which prevented
presentation of the whole to the public, greatly limited scholarly
criticism and review,' 3 ' and concealed from the Institute as well as
the Legislature, the unevenness and imperfections in the overall
product. The widely ranging enactment dates of related subject
matter are symptoms of serious defects, which range from the
incomplete integration ofbasic principles within the revised parts, the
uneven quality of the drafting, to a departure from the qualities to be
expected of a code in the French tradition. Some decoupling of the
Civil Code from that tradition was to be expected, but now it is clear
that the code no longer deserves to be called a code. It has lapsed
into an inferior type of codification which would be appropriately
called a digest.'32
130. For a history, description, and critical evaluation of the process, see F.
Zengel, Civil Code Revision in Louisiana, 54 Tul. L. Rev. 942 (1980).
131. The benefits of public review led to the rejection of a projet to revise the
Civil Code in 1910. The work of the three revisers was poorly executed and
amounted to a common law style of code. It received widespread criticism from the
public and the Bar and was ultimately abandoned by the legislature. For details, see
A.N. Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years in the Life of the Louisiana Civil Code:
1870 and 1913, 53 La. L. Rev. 5 (1992). A comparison with the codification
process in Germany is also useful. In the twenty year gestation of the BGB there
were three stages. A first commission, appointed in 1874, consisted of 11 members
which included 6 judges, 2 professors, and 3 functionaries. The commission made
its projet public in 1887, along with 5 volumes of preparatory works. The projet
immediately attracted extensive criticism in more than 600 publications, of which
the most famous were the critiques of Otto von Gierke and Anton Menger. The
negative reaction led the government to appoint a second and larger commission
consisting of 10 permanent members and 12 non-permanent members which
submitted a revised projet (also 6 volumes of preparatory work) to the legislature
in 1895. After further corrections and modifications, the BGB was promulgated on
August 18, 1896 and went into effect on January 1, 1900. For a synopsis of this
background, see Claude Witz, Droit Priv6 Allemand: Actes juridiques, droits
subjectifs 28-29 (Litec 1992).
132. See infra section 4.0. The results abundantly confirm the wisdom of
Descartes' dictum that "there is very often less perfection in works composed of
several portions, and carried out by the hands of various masters, than in those on
which one individual alone has worked." Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method,
31 Great Books 44 (1952).
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3.1 Summary of the Completed Work
By a rough count, this author estimates that as of January 2003,
approximately 72% of the Civil Code has been fully revised.
Accordingly about 28% of the 1870 Civil Code remains in place, and
so there are many enclaves of old articles still coexisting and interacting
with the new. Only Books II and IV can be considered totally
complete. The summary below is not chronological. It begins at the
front of the Code and proceeds book by book and title by title, rather
than according to the respective dates of enactment. The haphazard
sequence of the completion dates should serve as a first indication of the
inherent problems both of coordination and policymaking that have
been mentioned above.
Preliminary Title. The Preliminary Title of the Civil Code was
revised in 1987.
Book One. The revision of Book I (Persons) began in 1987, but is
still incomplete. Certain titles were revised in 1976, 1987, 1990, and
1997 but the subjects of Domicile, Legitimate Filiation, Adoption,
Parental Authority, Minors, Tutorship, and Emancipation have not been
completed at this time.
Book Two. The entirety of Book I (Property) was revised from
1976-1979. It now consists of seven instead of six titles.
Book Three. The revision of Book III (Modes of Acquiring
Property) began in 1981 and has been selective. In Title I, which is
devoted to Successions, the first three chapters were revised in 1981,
followed by the revision of four more chapters in 1997.33 As to Title II
on Donations, the chronology is back and forth. Capacity to make and
receive donations was revised in 1991 and new provisions on forced
heirship (which caused a vehement polemic)" came into effect in 1996.
The subject of prohibited donations was revised in 2001 and chapters
on making, revoking, and probating testaments were revised in 1997.
Disinherison was revised in 2001. There still remain a few pockets
within Title II that have not been revised, such as donations inter vivos.
133. Provisions in the law of succession relating to collation have not been
comprehensively revised.
134. See Katherine Connell-Thouez, New Forced Heirship in Louisiana, 43 Loy.
L. Rev. 1 (1997); Katherine S. Spaht, Kathryn V. Lorio, Cynthia Picou, Cynthia
Samuel, & Frederick W. Swaim, Jr., New Forced Heirship Legislation: A
Regrettable "Revolution, "50 La. L. Rev. 409 (1990); Cynthia Samuel, Letter From
Louisiana: An Obituary for Forced Heirship and a Birth Announcement for
Covenant Marriage, 12 Tul. Eur. & Civ. L.F. 183 (1997).
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Continuing with our summary of Book III, the revision of Title
II (Obligations in General) and Title IV (Contracts) was completed
in 1984. Title V (Obligations Arising Without Agreement) was
revised in 1995, and Title VI (Matrimonial Regimes) in 1979.
Important particular contracts which have been revised are: Sales
(1993), Partnership (1980), Mandate (1997), Suretyship (1987), and
Mortgages (1991, 1992). Still awaiting revision are the following
particular contracts: Lease, 35 Labor Contracts, Rents and Annuities,
Loan, Deposit, Aleatory Contracts, Transaction or Compromise,
Respite, Arbitration, and Pledge. The Titles respectively devoted to
Occupancy and Possession and Prescription were revised in 1982 and
1983. The Title devoted to Privileges, however, has not as yet been
changed.
Book Four. An unprecedented Book Four was added to the Code
in 1991. This Book, devoted to Conflict of Laws, has eight titles, no
chapters, and a total of 34 articles.
3.2 The Lingering Influence of French Law in the Revision
It is beyond the scope of the article to attempt a detailed study of
the revised code articles and to compare them with the French
sources. My purpose here is only to give the most general indication
of the new direction which Louisiana has taken. The main tool that
I propose to use is a table that appears in the appendix to the current
edition of the Louisiana Civil Code. 36 Table 5 has six columns
tracing the sources of code articles back in time, beginning on the left
with the 1976-2001 Revision, and moving across the page to
corresponding articles of the Civil Code of 1870, the Civil Code of
1825, the Projet Civil Code of 1825, the Civil Code of 1808 and
finally to the Code Napolion
Relying primarily upon this Table, but sometimes making actual
textual comparisons to be satisfied of the Table's accuracy, the author
calculates that about 1,288 provisions in today's code (counting both
revised and remaining unrevised articles) are traceable to the Code
Napolion. This amounts to about one-third of the whole. When the
entire revision is completed, however, this fraction may change
somewhat, though probably not dramatically.
I should explain that when I say these articles are traceable to the
Code Napolgon, I am no longer speaking in the sense of "verbatim"
or "almost verbatim" sources, as Professor Batiza used those terms,
135. The author is advised, however, that the revision of lease is completed and
will soon be submitted to the Legislature.
136. La. Civ. Code Vol. II, Table 5 (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., 2002).
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but in my own, less scientific, sense. The revision, even when it
wished to remain faithful to the previous law, almost always varied
the language somewhat by rendering the same rule or principle in
more colloquial English. At other times the revisers have been
known to collapse several rules into one in search of a more efficient
melange. Thus, an appreciation of the French influence today must
be an evaluation both of substance and form, and perhaps the former
more than the latter. Where the redactors have not signaled a change
in the law and the French substantive foundation is still perceptible
though expressed in a different formula, I have regarded the link as
still intact. 137 The strength and obviousness of these links, however,
do vary somewhat from area to area, as will be pointed out below.
Property: A Strong Repository. When one glances at different
segments of the Revision, it is clear that the Property provisions
retain the greatest French influence. Nearly 60% of the revised law
of property, 216 out of 370 articles, has a substantive basis in the
Code Napolion. What distinguishes this field is that the linguistic
connections to the source articles in the Code Napolion are still
apparent after so many years. The tenacity of tradition is always
remarkable to observe, but this degree may be surprising, particularly
when bearing in mind that no small measure of modernization was
also accomplished. A number of modem ideas and institutions were
introduced that were inspired by other European codes.'38 These new
features allowed for deimmobilization of property, the personal
137. Perhaps an example, drawn at random, will illustrate how the underlying
monument is not totally obscured from view even after considerable linguistic
evolution. Code Napoleon art. 589 (1804) states:
Si l'usufruit comprend des choses qui, sans se consumer de suite, se
d~teriorent peu i peu par l'usage, comme du linge, des meubles
meublans, l'usufruiter a le droit de s'en servir pour l'usage auquel elles
sont destinres, et n'est oblige de les rendre, i la fm de l'usufruit, que
dans l'6tat ofi elles se trouvent, non dit~rior~es par son dol ou par sa
faute.
Revised Louisiana Civil Code article 569 (1976) states:
If the usufructuary has not disposed of corporeal movables that are by
their nature impaired by use, wear, or decay, he is bound to restore
them to the owner in the state in which they may be at the end of the
usufruct.
The usufructuary is relieved of this obligation if the things are entirely
worn out by normal use, wear, or decay.
138. This represents of course a new diversification of legal tradition in
Louisiana. It often reflects the legal culture of the Reporter. By Professor
Yiannopoulos' count, the Greek Civil Code has been cited as the source of 86
articles of the Louisiana Civil Code. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Hellenic Legal
Tradition in the United States, 42 Loy. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1996). For instance, the
sources of the revised law of usufruct have been expanded to include references to
the Greek Civil Code, the BGB, and the Swiss Civil Code.
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servitude of right of use, building restrictions, and special treatment
of ownership in indivision.
Contracts: A Surprising Fidelity. The Code Napoljon remains an
important ground for the field of contracts. It was estimated by the
same method that 79 out of the 151, or about 52%, of the revised
articles have some grounding in the Code Napolon. At a linguistic
level, substantial liberties have been taken and the provenance of the
articles has become less apparent.
Partnership and Sales: Illustrating An Uneven Connection. It
has been already mentioned that the style and quality of the Revision
depends upon personal factors and personnel choices. Attitudes
toward maintenance of the French tradition have been known to vary
in accordance with the philosophical orientation of the principal
drafter. According to the Table, about 46% of the new Partnership
articles have antecedents in the Code Napoleon, but a random
comparison shows that the Table is misleading. In many cases the
French monument can no longer be discerned. The same is true in
some cases for the law of sales. Though the Table would indicate
that about 49% are French-inspired, this seems to be an
overstatement.
4. 0 Loss of Navigational Direction
It might be said that the greatest influence which the Code
Napoleon has had on Louisiana over the past two hundred years has
not consisted so much in the specific French content of the law but
in the high ideals of codification which it held aloft for all to see. A
code must be clear, coherent, complete, and logical.' 39 Well
exemplified in the Code Napolion, these qualities served as the north
star for first navigators like Edward Livingston and Louis Moreau
Lislet, and they continued to be fixed points of reference for lost
travelers in the meandering course of Louisiana history.
139. "A Code, for a Frenchman, should be complete in its field; it should lay
down general rules, and it should arrange them logically." Andr6 Tunc, The Grand
Outlines of the Code Napoleon, 29 Tul. L. Rev. 431,444 (1955). For basic criteria
of the concept, see J. Vanderlinden, Le concept de code en Europe occidentale du
XIIIeme au XIX eme si~cle, 67 et seq, 89 et seq (1967); see also Reinhard
Zimmermann, Codification: history and present significance of an idea, 3 Euro.
Rev. of Private Law 95, 96-97 (1995). Zimmermann requires three characteristics
in a code: A code must be enacted by the legislature, must aim at being
comprehensive, and must be systematically and rationally organized. For this
reason, Zimmermann argues, one cannot say that Roman law was ever codified.
The Digest of Justinian was a compilation not a code. For a differentiation between
codes according to their method and purpose, see Bruno Oppetit, Essai sur la
codification (PUF 1998); and De la codification, in B. Beignier, La Codification
14-18 (Dalloz 1996) (distinguishing between compilations, consolidations, reform
codes, and codes "i droit constant").
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Increasingly, scholarly opinion in Louisiana has come to realize
that these ideals were either abandoned or severely compromised
during the Revision. The present writer ventured to say in 1988,
when the Revision was only 40% complete, that the Civil Code had
already died at the hands of the Revision and that a Digest had sprung
up in its place."4 There were at first spirited denials and lively
debate, 4' but then the controversy-which was then rather
theoretical-grew quiescent, that is until recently. Professor John
Lovett, testing the author's reasoning in an important controversy in
the field of property, finds that the analysis correctly prophesied the
serious methodological difficulty which is now apparent.142
Furthermore, a renowned scholar who was also chief architect of the
Revision, Professor Yiannopoulos, has recently come to a similar
conclusion about the effects of the Revision. In his essay "Requiem
for a Civil Code," he writes that the Civil Code has indeed become
a Digest and possesses almost nothing in common with traditional
codes. 143
While it is common ground that a dramatic change has occurred,
the emphasis in these critical writings is not necessarily the same
because the intervening period of fourteen years has added significant
new facts to the diagnosis.
Professor Yiannopoulos stresses the multiple and cumulative
assault on the Code stretching back as far as 1960. He notes "the
swarms" of repeals and amendments to the Code which were
prompted by the adoption of a series of other codes, including the
Trust Code, the Mineral Code, and the Commercial Code. The
curtailment of forced heirship, he argues, was a grave assault which
left scores of Civil Code provisions suspended in air with little or no
significance. He points to the "undisciplined" and "uncoordinated"
nature of the Revision process,' 44 and he condemns the Legislature
for a host of"leges barbarorum" which have dismantled the splendid
edifice the code once was. He concludes with this assessment:
140. Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of a Code-The Birth of a Digest, 63 Tul. L.
Rev. 221 (1988).
141. See The Great Debate over the Louisiana Civil Code's Revision, 5 The
Tulane Civil Law Forum 49-99 (1990).
142. John Lovett, Another Great Debate?: The Ambiguous Relationship
Between the Revised Civil Code and Pre-Revision Jurisprudence as Seen Through
the Prytania Park Controversy, 48 Loy. L. Rev. 615 (2002).
143. Yiannopoulos, supra note 7. For the meaning of the word "digest" in civil
law and common law, see Palmer, supra note 8, at 225-26.
144. "The revision ... was entrusted to numerous reporters from the bar, the
bench, and academic institutions. These reporters did not have a blue print for code
revision and did not share the same credentials, education, experience, or even legal
orientation." Yiannopoulos, supra note 7, at 402.
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The comprehensive statute titled "Louisiana Civil Code" is,
indeed a Digest.... It is a conglomeration of mini-codes
arranged in four Books.... There is not much resemblance
left with traditional codes, whether ancient or contemporary.
For better or for worse, the Louisiana Civil Code reflects a
fusion of the civilian and the common law traditions in a truly
mixed jurisdiction.
I respectfully agree with these insights, but I must also return to
the central thesis of my 1988 article.14 5-That the Code has become a
Digest can be shown in two related ways. First, it was clearly
demonstrated that the Revision did not make an explicit repeal of the
old 1870 code articles. It adopted instead the approach called
"implied repeal" whereby old provisions are not repealed unless they
are substantively inconsistent with the new articles. The attentive
reader will recall, this was the same approach used by the redactors
of the 1808 Digest and was the main reason why that enactment was
deemed to be a Digest and why, due to the intolerable level of legal
uncertainty it entailed, a second code was needed in 1825. The
Revision now reverts to the same functional level as the Digest of
1808 since the relationship between the new law and the old is
exactly the same. In a recent article, Professor David Gruning of
Loyola Law School correctly sums up that situation:
To decide whether amending and re-enacting has worked an
implied repeal, one must compare the language of articles of
the revised code with that of articles of the 1870 Code. With
sufficient lawyerly skill (and sufficient client interest),
whenever the language differs one may legitimately argue
during litigation that the prior law is still in effect. Indeed,
when the prior law is not inconsistent with the revised
legislation, the lawyer is in fact ethically obligated to present
such arguments. 146
Noting that this deprives the Revision of "the crucial
characteristic of exclusivity," Professor Gruning continues:
Without an explicit repeal of the prior law, the revised Code
is merely the place where one may begin legal research, just
as with a digest; but one cannot stop there. The 1870 Code
and the jurisprudence and doctrine interpreting it remain
relevant sources of the law .... One's research on a given
145. Palmer, supra note 8.
146. David Griming, Mapping Society Through Law: Louisiana Civil Law
Recodified, 1 Stan. J.L. Gender & Law (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 43) (on
file with author).
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issue will lead the reader immediately into the thicket of
jurisprudence, of caselaw.'47
The learned writer could just as well have been describing the legal
scene in 1808 as in 2004, for the legal situation under any digest is
the same.
The second basis for the transformation into a Digest is the
fundamental change brought about at a structural and methodological
level. The code has lost the qualities of being coherent and complete
in its field. It is no longer possible to develop syllogisms from texts
alone, for the texts are not self-contained starting points of analysis.
A great number of texts were purposively designed to be limited and
incomplete propositions that would receive extensive
supplementation from a source which did not need to be submitted to
the legislature-the jurisprudence. Such texts contain "planned" gaps
(contrast these to unintentional lacunae which drafters cannot always
foresee) which are to be filled by precedents decided under the prior
codes.141 One naturally expects an old code to have acquired a heavy
gloss of interpretive jurisprudence (the unrevised Louisiana Civil
Code certainly fell into that category, which was one reason why it
needed to be revised) but one does not expect a newly revised code,
from its inception, to come loaded down by the gloss of a prior code.
In that case, the redactor inflicts decodification upon his own child
before it comes into the world.
147. Id. (manuscript at 43-44) (on file with author).
148. The "encoding" of the old jurisprudence adds an interesting dimension to
an old and rather inconclusive debate in Louisiana about whether judicial
precedents do have (or should have) a strong or weak value. The traditional debate
usually pitted the theory ofjurisprudence constante (a French theory of precedent
dear to civilian purists) against the American version of stare decisis (a version
which some believe corresponds to actual judicial practice in Louisiana). There is
an open clash between the civilian theory found in the Civil Code (jurisprudence
is only a secondary source of law: La.Civ. Code art. 1, and Comment (b)), and the
realist's empirical observation that even a single decision by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana binds every lower court to follow it. For details, see Palmer & Sheynes,
supra note 97, at 283-87. The traditional debate, however, usually discussed what
weight Louisiana courts attributed to their own precedents. The presence of an
encoded jurisprudence, however, adds a new element to this equation. Now the
Legislature itself establishes the weight to be given--over and above that which the
courts might ordinarily give-to a select set of holdings. For purists who normally
think in terms of law as an emanation of the legislative power, this legislatively-
backed jurisprudence appears to have greater authority than mere jurisprudence
constante. Has Louisiana stumbled upon the phenomenon of jurisprudence
permanente?
149. On the concept of decodification, see Natalino Irti, L'ettz de della
decodificazione (3d ed. 1989); Vernon V. Palmer, Celebrating the Quebec
Codification Achievement: A Louisiana Perspective, 38 Loy. L. Rev. 311 (1992);
Zimmermann, supra note 139, at 103-04.
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A planned gap obviously will be filled in accordance with the
drafters' plan. It cannot be filled by resort to the traditional technique
of code analogy or by internal resort to the directory clause of the code,
even though the revision still contains a directory clause.50 The
comments appended to the articles constitute the codifier's plan. They
instruct how to splice the code text with particular case rulings from
the past-the exact names and citations of these "encoded" cases are
given-and in such instances the major premise of a legal syllogism
must be one part legislative, one part judicial. The comments are a
road map of the unwritten law which lies beyond the texts.
4.1 Some Examples of the Digest Methodology
The examples are legion but I will present only four here. For
reasons of space the analysis is very abbreviated.'
1. Revised article 3467 declares that prescription runs against all
persons "unless exception is established by legislation." In Comment
(D), however, the redactor states that pre-revision cases like Corsey v.
State Department of Corrections,52 are not superseded but are still
relevant. The doctrine of contra non valentem establishes a judicial
rule that halts the running of prescription. Thus, the redactor
contradicts himself by encoding an unwritten exception within a text
categorically excluding unwritten exceptions.1"
2. An act under private signature, according to Article 1837,
"need not be written by the parties, but must be signed by them."
This text requires an act under private signature to be signed by all
parties, which for bilateral engagements means multiple-signatures.
But in comment (b) the redactor says that the article is not intended
to change the jurisprudential rule that an act under private signature
is valid even though signed by one party alone. The redactor's
comment cites (and thereby 'encodes') six pre-revision cases which
recognize circumstances in which single-signature private acts are
valid. The redactor contradicts herself therefore by establishing a
categorical rule in the text while insisting upon an inconsistent
exception found in pre-revision jurisprudence.
150. The directory clause is indeed still there. Article 4 declares, "When no rule
for a particular situation can be derived from legislation or custom, the court is
bound to proceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to justice,
reason, and prevailing usages." It has, however, nothing to do with the strange
'planned' gaps of the revised code.
151. For more extended treatment and further examples, see my essay, Death
of a Code, supra note 8; Lovett, supra note 142.
152. 375 So. 2d 319 (La. 1979) (recognizing the doctrine ofcontra non valentem
non currit praescriptio).
153. Post-revision judicial decisions have continued to apply the doctrine of
contra non valentem. See also Article 3492, which contains the same contradiction.
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3. Component parts of an immovable, according to revised
Article 466, are things "permanently attached" to an immovable. The
text continues: "Things are considered permanently attached if they
cannot be removed without substantial damage to themselves or to
the immovable to which they are attached." No test other than that
of "substantial damage" is proposed by the article or its comments.
Yet it is maintained by learned authority that a "societal
expectations" test, derived from pre-revision cases, must be read into
the article. 5 4  The societal expectations test appears to have
originated in the case ofLa Fleur v. Foret.15 If this interpretation of
the provision prevails, the pre-revision jurisprudence again
supplements or even overrides the revised text. 156 One cannot apply
the societal expectations test without employing the methodology of
a digest.
Putative marriages produce protective effects for the spouse in
good faith and for his/her child." 7 Revised Article 96 declares, "An
absolutely null marriage nevertheless produces civil effects in favor
of a party who contracted it in good faith for as long as that party
remains in good faith." (Emphasis added). This text clearly extends
protection to a null marriage when there has been a celebration of the
marriage ("contracted" in good faith), but the redactor writes in
Comment (e) that because of the pre-revision case of Succession of
Marinoni, 158 the question of whether these effects flow when there
was no ceremony at all is deliberately sidestepped. In the 1936 case
of Succession of Marinoni the Supreme Court applied the putative
marriage doctrine to confer legitimacy upon a child of a marriage that
had never been celebrated. Comment (e) concludes as follows: "The
ultimate decision whether to follow Succession of Marinoni in
preference to the two contrary cases previously cited, however, is left
to the discretion of the court under this revision."
The redactor refuses to take a position on the question, preferring
to empower courts to follow either lines of pre-revision precedent.
154. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Of Immovables, Component Parts, Societal
Expectations, and the Forehead of Zeus, 60 La. L. Rev. 1379, 1396-97 (2000);
Amy Alluns, Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. General Star Indemnity Co.: How a Small
Hotel Made a Big Different in the Component Part Concept, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 1543,
1550 (2000).
155. 213 So. 2d 141 (3rd Cir. 1968).
156. See Lovett, supra note 142, at 703.
157. I am indebted to David Gruning's essay, Mapping Society Through Law,
supra note 146, at 39, for this example and the following analysis. Gruning uses
the putative spouse problem to show that "the current Louisiana Code is one firmly
anchored in the prior Code and the caselaw and doctrine that interpreted it. The re-
codifiers have stayed quite close to the sources involved."
158. 164 So. 797 (La. 1936). See Charles Marshall, The Necessity of Ceremony
in a Putative Marriage, 10 Tul. L. Rev. 435 (1936).
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The old jurisprudence rather than the text is determinative on this
question. The redactor opted for the methodology of a digest.
4.2 Code or Digest: Does it Matter?
Before proceeding further, it may be asked what difference it
makes whether Louisiana has a code or a digest. Does this issue
amount to just an aesthetic regret by code romantics? Decidedly not.
The advantages of codification over unwritten law are that it makes
the law public, certain and accessible to the average citizen. A
rational citizen's code has always been thought of as an
emancipatory instrument which lets the citizen know his/her rights
and duties, promotes the rule of law and avoids unnecessary
litigation.' Our code, however, no longer offers these advantages
in my view. The comments, the truncated texts, and the "encoded"
jurisprudence are surely no longer addressed to the average citizen.
The code is now written for the legal professional, for only a skilled
lawyer or judge with access to case reports and possessing the legal
skills to reconcile the cases with the code can hope to unravel this
technical material. Even for lawyers, however, the code frequently
generates such uncertainty on basic legal questions that it cannot
guide a professional properly. The efficiency and legal certainty
which a true code offers have to a substantial extent been sacrificed
to judicial discretion.6' Too many answers are no longer found in
the code itself but in the forehead of the judge. The primary sources
are spread out in libraries. The texts of the code are only the tip of
the iceberg. The ideal of one book containing the whole of private
law and the internal means of its own regeneration has thus been
lost. With pre-code cases now functioning as surrogates for positive
law, an arcane method and a world of jurisprudence lies just below
the surface.
159. See Zimmermann, supra note 139, at 100. Here was Paul Crrpeau's credo
for the Quebec Civil Code: "It is my belief that a Code must be written not for the
specialist but for the ordinary citizen with as little of the jargon as is compatible
with accuracy and precision of language. I have often said my greatest hope is, one
day, to see a citizen traveling in the Montreal subway, take out a pocket book
edition of the new Code, and watch him get absorbed in it with an air of
understanding." See Civil Code Revision in Qudbec, 34 La. L. Rev. 921, 932
(1974). For an excellent discussion of the values in "plain redaction for the
citizenry" and the "dialogic" function of codification, see McAuley, supra note 18.
160. On the value of legal certainty associated with a Code, see among the
papers of this symposium, John Lovett, On the Principle of Legal Certainty in the
Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: From the Manifesto to the Great Repealing Act and
Beyond, 63 La. L. Rev. 1397 (2004).
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5. 0 Diverse Comparisons Regarding the Form, Structure and Style
of the Revised Civil Code
Structure. It has been mentioned earlier that the structure of the
Civil Code has now four Books instead of three, but it is clear this
produces no deep-seated structural change. Book Four, which is
devoted to Conflict of Laws, is simply an add-on of new material.
The new book has not caused any sequential rearrangement nor any
subtraction from the content of the first three. The importance of this
last remark is that the structure inherited from the Code Napoldon
was neither rethought nor recast. The old tripartite
structure-Persons, Things and Modes of Acquiring Things-
remains the basic organization of the Civil Code despite the cogent
criticisms that led some continental codes to reorganize the
arrangement for reasons of greater transparency.' A separate book
devoted to Family Law, for example, as in the Swiss and German
codes, would have made a coherent whole out of those parts of Book
I and Book I which deal with husband and wife, separation and
divorce, marriage contracts, and community of property. 62 A
separate book devoted to Successions, as in the German, Greek,
Italian, and Dutch codes, is arguably more understandable to the lay
mind than to lump it among the means of acquiring things. The
general principles of Obligations and the particular contracts might
well be broken out into a separate book.' Critics attribute the non-
debate of such questions to the piecemeal approach and an
unwillingness to engage in debate over general policy.
The fragmented revision process has also resulted in some
unsystematic use of civilian concepts. Important organizing ideas
which are introduced by a Reporter in "his" part of the Code have
been inexplicably ignored by another in "her" part. For example, the
161. Agreeing with Marcel Planiol that prolix Book III is a rag-bag of
heterogeneous matters, Zweigert and K6tz conclude that "[t]he structure of the
Code civil is plainly unsatisfactory." Konrad Zweight & Kein Koetz, Introduction
to Comparative Law 93 (Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998).
162. Fred Zengel drew attention to this failure and regarded it a lost opportunity.
Zengel, supra note 130.
163. In 1980, my colleague Shael Herman made a very valuable study of civilian
classification schemes in which he presented a panorama of the structures found in
modem codes.The ostensible purpose may have been to foster debate on the subject
and his intended audience was probably the Louisiana Law Institute. This type of
study, had it been requested before the revision began rather than in medias res,
might have been of great assistance to the Institute. By the time it appeared,
however, the revision was already too far along for it to have the intended effect.
Shael Herman & David Hoskins, Perspectives on Code Structure: Historical




concept of the "juridical act" which was first systematized in German
law, is new to our code (though not unknown to the doctrine)' 64 and
has ramifications for every part of the Code. It is inexplicably
absent, however, in the vital field of obligations. The omission is
completely illogical. Elsewhere the concept appears in about twenty
code provisions stretching from the Preliminary Title, 65 the law of
Persons, 66 the law of Property, 167 the law of Successions, 161
Mandate, 169 Prescription 7 ° Matrimonial Regimes 71 and ending with
the provisions on Conflict of Laws. 172 The general use of this new
concept in every connection except the general principles of
obligations and contracts provides an important example of the
accidental inconsistencies and variations which befall a piecemeal
process.
Failure to Repeal the 1870 Code Provisions. As mentioned
earlier, the Revised Code of Louisiana makes no attempt to repeal its
predecessor. Study of the enacting legislation shows" that the old
code articles were not expressly repealed and therefore applying the
Code's own principles of repeal, they have not been superseded,
except in accordance with the notion of implied repeal. An implied
repeal would only occur, however, when the new article flatly
contradicts the old so that there is a substantive incompatibility. The
study concludes that probably 85% of the old code concurrently
survives with the new. The situation compares to the 6ne which
existed at the time of the Digest of 1808.
Didactic Materials. The code may now strike an observer as less
doctrinal and explanatory than its predecessors. Many of the old
examples and definitions have been taken out of the enacted texts.
From another perspective, however, the code can hardly be called
less didactic than before. The decision to bond the enacted texts to
an encoded jurisprudential framework and to place preparatory
materials under each article has made the Civil Code into a very
bulky and extremely pedagogical document.'74 It is somewhat
164. See Marcel Planiol, 1 La. Civil Law Treatise, Part One, (LSLI transl.,
1959); Sail Litvinoff and W. Thomas Tete, Louisiana Legal Transactions: The
Civil Law of Juridical Acts (Claitor's Publishing 1969).
165. La. Civ. Code. art. 7.
166. See La. Civ. Code arts. 28, 49, 392, 394, 395.
167. See La. Civ. Code arts. 492, 654, 776, 797, 807.
168. La. Civ. Code art. 1609.
169. La. Civ. Code arts. 2985, 2986.
170. La. Civ. Code arts. 3471, 3483.
171. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.1.
172. La. Civ. Code art. 3541.
173. For details, see Palmer, supra note 8, at 222-42.
174. Fred Zengel noted that they add "outrageously" to the length of the
Revision and prophetically added "The Comments will effectively become as much
2003] 1123
4LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
axiomatic that a Digest has a greater need for didactic materials than
a true code.
Style. The casual reader of the Revision will immediately notice
that the reworked texts fall considerably below the stylistic standards
set by our 19th century Civil Code. When the revisers attempted to
restate elegant epigrams in their own way, they usually destroyed the
cadence and concision. Thus the principle that "[t]he sale of a thing
belonging to another is null" became "[t]he sale of a thing belonging
to another does not convey ownership. 7  An attempt to improve
upon Domat's famous illustration of the sale of a hope produced
more words and less clarity. The original text taken from Domat
read:
It also happens sometimes that an uncertain hope is sold; as
the fisher sells a haul of his net before he throws it: and,
although he should catch nothing, the sale still exists, because
it was the hope that was sold, together with the right to have
what might be caught.
The revisers preferred to say (emphasis added):
A hope may be the object of a contract of sale. Thus, a
fisherman may sell a haul of his net before he throws it. In
that case the buyer is entitled to whatever is caught in the net,
according to the parties' expectations, and even if nothing is
caught the sale is valid.
Professor Yiannopoulos has noted 76 that some provisions are
unintentionally amusing. An article dealing with the usufruct of the
surviving spouse in community of property states: "This usufruct
terminates when the surviving spouse dies or remarries, whichever
occurs first." As editor of the Civil Code, he remarked: "This article
declares that this usufruct of the surviving spouse 'terminates when
the surviving spouse dies or remarries, whichever occurs first.' It is
hardly likely that a usufructuary may first die and then remarry. Cf.
Mark 12.25: 'For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither
marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels which are in
heaven."'
The appearance of the Revised Code has been considerably
disfigured by literally hundreds of blank provisions which are called
"reserved articles." Such articles are actually assigned sequential
numbers and are listed on the page though they contain no text. The
reason for this strange practice is never explained, but there is no
a part of the Code as the code texts themselves." Zengel, supra note 130, at 960.
175. La. Civ. Code art. 2452.
176. Yiannopoulos, supra note 7, at 404.
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doubt that the practice is out of control. In the Title on Sales, for
example, there are 70 "reserved articles" interspersed among 211
actual articles. The result is a Code with a bullet-riddled appearance.
Of course one reason to reserve articles could be the belief that the
space could be needed for future amendments, but the need for so
much space and its arbitrary distribution suggest that this is not the
real cause. The likely reason for the anomaly is actually trivial. It is
nostalgia for old code numbering. The revisers wanted lawyers and
judges to feel comfortable with the new code, so they retained the
original numbers of certain cherished provisions. If it is so, this
basically weightless justification is not only the cause of aesthetic
damage, but worse, it petrifies the structure of the code into an
historic numbering system. That numbering system automatically
prevented any revamping of the basic structure or organization of the
original code material.
Finally, one must appreciate how much jargon has found its way
into the revised Code. A large number of revised articles begin with
the words "[i]n the absence of contrary agreement" or "[u]nless
otherwise agreed.""' These are stylistic blemishes in a legal system
which can systematically earmark imperative provisions, as opposed
to suppletive code provisions that the parties may vary by agreement.
Equally distressing is that so many provisions now contain empty
crossreferencing formulas such as "Unless otherwise provided by
law" (or the equally vacuous "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
Book"). 178 To continually warn that there may be an exception to a
given rule somewhere in the expanse of the law, but then not to
disclose which exception is being referred to or whether one really
exists, is virtually useless information and a source of annoyance to
the reader. This resembles the style of the Uniform Commercial
Code, not a code in the French tradition.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Essay has been about the legacy which France bequeathed
to Louisiana nearly two centuries ago. Two Louisiana codes enacted
in the early 19th century received a rich deposit of Napoleonic law
that stood the test of time for over 150 years. The modernization and
recodification of the past 35 to 40 years, however, brought significant
changes to the nature and content of Louisiana's Civil Code and, in
consequence, modified this historic tie to France. The Revision
internationalized sources and influences, accepting some from
177. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 2803, 2807.
178. This type of phrase is particularly recurrent in Book IV on Conflict of
Laws. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 3515, 3523, 3524, 3537, 3541, 3542.
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modem civilian codes, others from American law. In the areas
where modernization was needed, the Code Civil played little or no
role at all. Nevertheless in areas where the Revision was not
particularly deep, the old French content was not seriously disturbed.
Indeed it is still quite evident and discernible. Since it has been
reaffirmed by the Revision, these ties will continue far into the future.
In at least two respects, however, the legacy of the Code
Napoleon is now extinguished. First, the Revision has resulted in an
inferior form of codification which presupposes an encoded caselaw
methodology and no longer resembles the French concept of a code.
Second, the revised code has lost some of the stylistic elegance for
which the Code Napolgon and predecessor Louisiana codes were
praised.
It is perhaps a truism to observe that recodification is almost
always a more difficult and challenging task than the original act of
codification. Apparently it is not easy to rekindle the same
combination of spirit, political will, and talented individuals which
produced the original. " The goals may be less clear, the policies
less obvious, and old ideals may be forgotten or no longer shared.
Perhaps these are some reasons why recodifiers often take so much
longer to complete their work, and often attempt to appease the
Legislature by submitting a code in small increments. Perhaps only
at the end when these bits and pieces are finally reassembled and
examined does one discover whether one still has a code for the
twenty-first century worthy of the name. As France prepares to
celebrate the Bicentennial of the Code Civil and to contemplate the
great recodification task which it must ultimately face, perhaps this
experience may be of some interest.
179. On the obstacles to recodification, see Palmer, supra note 151, at 313-14,
319 ff.
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